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ESSAY 



OiV THE 



NECESSITY OF IMPROVING 



BY 



WILLIAM THEOBALD WOLFE TONE, 

FORMERLY OFFICER OF LIGHT CAVALRY, AID-DE-CAMF IN THE FRENCH 
SERVICE, AND MEMBER OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR. 



Qu' ayant une armee, il faut I'avoir au moms egale, et, s'il se peut supe- 
Tieure a celles des autres puissances en discipline et en instruction. Car ce qui 
coute cher, tant au present que dans l'avenir, c'est une armee mediocre; 

Guibert, Defense du systeme de guerre moderne. Chap. H. 
Vol. IV. page 276. 



NEW-YORK : 

PUBLISHED BY KIRK AND MERCE1N, 

MO. 22, WALL-STREET. 

William A. Mercein, Printer. 







1819. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



A brief Analysis of the causes which have changed 
England from a free nation, into a great military power, 
and of her military improvements. 

CHAPTER II. 

Refutation of the popular opinion of the American?, con- 
cerning the late war — military analysis of that war, and of 
the principles on which it was conducted. 

CHAPTER III. 

Development of the principles on which the next contest 
between England and America will probably be conducted, 
and of the chief objects which Britain will then seek to ac- 
complish. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Investigation of the chief objections which are made to 
the augmentation and improvement of our military esta- 
blishments. Insufficiency of the navy and militia alone for 
the purposes of national defence. 

CHAPTER V. 

Necessity of organizing both the materiel and personnel of 
our defensive means on a permanent footing, in time of 
peace, and under the sole control of the national federal 
executive. 



IT CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VI. 

A brief abstract of the simplest, safest, and most effectual 
mode by which the national forces might be raised, instruct- 
ed, organized, and employed in time of peace and in time 
«f war. — Of their destination and numbers. 



PREFACE. 



THE object of this Essay is to disseminate 
through this country some useful notions, on im- 
portant subjects, which appear to be generally mis- 
understood, and to investigate some popular errors, 
which may hereafter prove very mischievous. 

It has been the peculiar happiness of America, 
that, to this day, she has had little occasion for mi- 
litary knowledge and military institutions. Whilst 
the rest of the world was agitated hy war and revolu- 
tion, she was allowed to ameliorate in peace her 
civil government, to augment her wealth and popu- 
lation, and to proceed in the career of improve- 
ment with a rapidity as yet unexampled. In conse- 
quence of this state of security and tranquillity, her 
people, with a very few exceptions, are complete- 
ly destitute of military knowledge. They are not 
aware of the weakness and insufficiency of their pre- 
sent means of defence, nor of the forces which may 
be turned against them. Their success in the last 
war, which was so highly creditable to their spirit 
and patriotism, has inspired them with a belief 
that they are strong enough to repel every attack. 

Prepossessed with this belief, the crudest notions 
have been advanced and maintained by statesmen 



VI PREFACE. 



and orators of the highest political talent, largest 
views, most brilliant eloquence, and purest patrio- 
tism and integrity. The handful of troops, compo 
sing the regular army of the United States, has been 
viewed with jealousy, and arraigned with virulence ; 
the liberties of the country have been almost pro 
claimed in danger, from their spirit of insubordina- 
tion. The necessity of maintaining any standing 
force in time of peace, or of making any preparations 
for a time of war, has been loudly denied ; the navy 
and militia, even under the various establishments 
of the different states, have been declared sufficient 
for the purposes of national defence, and any at- 
tempts to put the organization and service of the 
latter under the more immediate inspection and 
control of the executive central government, has 
been denounced as unconstitutional, and leading to 
military tyranny and usurpation. 

But the situation of America is materially altered. 
Europe, after all her struggles for liberty, appears, at 
least for the present, to have settled in lassitude and 
submission, and the combined efforts of her coalised 
sovereigns are joined to keep her down. At the 
head of this great confederation, Britain stands pa- 
ramount. These powers, and Britain especially, 
view this country with jealous and hostile feelings, 
as still maintaining those principles which they have 
crushed every where else, as fostering them and 
keeping them alive, perhaps to their future ruin. 
Britain, besides, fears for her naval ascendency and 
commercial monopoly, from our rising trade and 
improving navy, l/nder all these circumstances, we 



PREFACE. Vll 

cannot doubt, that if it is not in her power to destroy 
America, to overturn her government and constitu- 
tion, break her union, and reach to the sources of 
her prosperity, she will, at least, supported by the 
whole coalition, endeavour to put a stop to her fur- 
ther progress. 

Before the late wars and revolutions which have 
changed the whole face of Europe, the military in- 
stitutions of England were little superior to those of 
America ; a fact of which our people, who are too apt 
to take all their notions of that country from its own 
writers, are not sufficiently aware. This is well 
known to all military writers in Europe; it would lead 
us, however, too far to prove it by examples and illus- 
trations. But during the course of these wars, the 
whole character of her policy, government and con- 
stitution, has been gradually altered; she has assumed 
another ground amongst nations, and has become a 
formidable military power. 

To develop and illustrate this change, to dispel 
the dangerous illusions which our success in the last 
war has spread through the people, to prove that 
much more powerful means may and probably will 
be directed against us on the next occasion, such is 
the object of the first part of this work. To prove 
that our present means of defence would be totally 
inadequate to resist such an attack ; that they im- 
periously require • to be improved, organized and 
augmented, and that our liberties can run no dan- 
ger from such improvements on a moderate but suf- 
ficient scale, such is the object of the second. 

1 am aware that many of the opinions which 1 have 
expressed, will not at first view be popular; some 



Vlll PREFACE. 



of our institutions I have considered as faulty, some 
measures as ill directed and ill organized; the conduct 
of some portions of the nation, of powerful parties 
and corporate bodies, 1 have blamed on several oc- 
casions, and even considered some of those national 
triumphs on which our people pride themselves, 
as useless and unprofitable. But how should a good 
citizen serve his country ? Is it by flattery and decla- 
mation ? encouraging the people in a false and over- 
weening opinion of their own force ? undervaluing 
that of their enemies ? disguising to them every 
wholesome truth, and inspiring them with a vain con- 
fidence, the sure forerunner of disaster and defeat ? 
Must he forever cry, we are the first, the most en- 
lightened, the most instructed, the bravest people 
in the world ; our laws, establishments and institu- 
tions are all faultless ; our militia, an army of citi- 
zens and freemen, is irresistible ; our navy superior 
to all navies, and able to crush every opposition. — 
We need no instruction, we need no improvement? 

In a republic, where no operation can be under- 
taken by the government without the consent and 
approbation of the people, deceptions of such a 
nature are peculiarly mischievous and impolitic. It 
is the glorious, but sometimes inconvenient privi- 
lege of a republic, that its government cannot cover 
its operations with darkness and mystery. They 
must be explained ; they must be open as the day, 
that the people may judge of them. This must be 
my justification to those who would accuse me of 
exposing our weak points to the enemy. The peo- 
ple must know what kind of danger renders such 
and such measures necessary ; what evils they tend 



PREFACE. IX 

lo correct : they must know what points are weak, 
either in their territory, their institutions, or their 
establishments, before they will let them be strength- 
ened at their expense. 

I have little to add about myself and my mo- 
tives for writing this work. Brought to this coun- 
try in my infancy, by my father, an exile and 
a martyr in the cause of liberty, my earliest recol- 
lections were associated with the name of America. 
Returned to settle in it as a citizen, under the hos- 
pitable protection of its laws and constitution, 1 am 
studying those laws and that constitution since 
nearly three years, with increasing delight and ad- 
miration. My hopes and views are confined to the 
honest independence which I may acquire by per- 
sonal exertions at the bar, as soon as the period 
comes round which has been fixed by the wisdom of 
our legislature, for every foreigner to become ac- 
quainted with our manners and institutions, and to 
depose the leaven of national feelings, animosities 
and prejudices, before he becomes entitled to the 
rights and privileges, and before he is called upon 
to practise the duties of an American citizen. I 
can therefore have no other motive in writing this 
Essay, than the desire of exposing whatever I think 
conducive to the benefit of my adopted country. 
Reared in the military schools of France, where 
every thing relative to military instruction had been 
carried to perfection, I afterwards served three cam- 
paigns under Napoleon, as an officer of light cavalry 
and as a staff officer. I have been several times 
employed in the raising, organizing, and instructing 
of new corps. Acquainted therefore with the military 



PREFACE. 



institutions of that country, which have served as 
models to those of all Europe, I claim some right of 
understanding the subject of which I treat. 

Before I conclude, I must claim some indulgence 
for defects of style. The English language is ill 
adapted to write on military subjects ; it is remark- 
bly deficient in military technical expressions, cor- 
responding to those of the French. I have perhaps 
insisted too much upon elementary notions and prin- 
ciples, but they appeared to me to be little known 
to the generality of the people. The same ideas, 
the same words are repeated perhaps too frequent- 
ly; sometimes for the sake of clearness, sometimes 
from the necessity of recurring to the same idea in the 
course of argument, and inculcating it more strong- 
ly. But if my meaning is always plain, and easily 
understood, I shall be satisfied ; and if the matter of 
the work be approved of, I hope that the form and 
manner will be excused. 



CHAPTER I. 



A brief Analysis of the Causes which have changed England 
from a free Nation into a great Military Power, and of he< 
Military Improvements. 

A. French engineer of distinguished talent, Chevalier Dupin, 
has lately travelled through England to examine into the pre- 
sent state of her military establishments. The view which 
that able officer has given of her recent military improve- 
ments, and of the immense means of hostility collected in her 
arsenals, is calculated to inspire every reflecting mind with 
the most awful forebodings. — (1) vide note 1. However 
sellish her policy may have been, however offensive her 
pride, whatever evils she may have inflicted upon him- 
self, or upon his country, still every friend of reason, 
justice, and liberty, must confess that the world owes incalcu- 
lable benefits to England. Her constitution, however ira-. 
perfect and overpraised, afforded the first model of a liberal 
government, sanctifying the individual rights and the indi- 
vidual independence of man. English principles, and Eng- 
lish laws, laid the foundation of American freedom. To see 
that country rapidly exchanging the character of a free na- 
tion for that of a military power, must strike even her great- 
est enemies with melancholy reflections. 

The causes of this unfortunate change are easily traced. — 
When France, towards the conclusion of the last century, 
broke the shackles of a weak and viciots government, the 
jealous selfishness of England took the alarm ; some states- 
men may have perceived and justly feared, that France, de- 
livered from its feudal trammels, would soon have eclipsed 



Chap. i. 12 

England ; the short-sighted and bigoted hatred of the common 
people did not look so far, and they were more honest in their 
open aversion. But the cry that France must be put down, and 
government strengthened for that purpose, was nearly univer- 
sal. The generous voice of the few who sympathised with 
the cause of liberty in every part of the world, was drowned 
by the general clamour, and all opposition to government be- 
came unpopular. Europe was paid, was armed by England, 
and from the Caucasus to the pillars of Hercules, torn from 
her foundations and hurled upon France. Inexperienced in 
the formation and march of a free government, the French on 
their side were obliged to forego their attempts for establish- 
ing it on a firm and regular foundation ; terror at such a uni- 
versal attack forced them also to strengthen their executive, and 
the crimes of Robespierre and the jacobins, and the military 
reign of Napoleon, were thus brought, were even forced on 
by the efforts of England and continental Europe, to crush 
the rising liberties of France. 

But these efforts soon recoiled upon themselves. When 
France was forced to become a military nation, she found in 
her old establishments and institutions a strength which the 
world had not foreseen. She posseised the only corps of 
scientific engineers and the best artillery in Europe, her ar- 
senals were provided on the grandest scale, a triple line of 
fortresses, the eternal monuments of Vauban's genius, cover- 
ed her frontiers, and all these establishments had been foster- 
ed and improved with constant care since the age of Louis 
XIV. The inexperience and indocility of her troops, was 
almost compensated by their enthusiastic valour ; the science 
of war and of tactics had been a subject of study and medi- 
tation to her officers for two centuries, and after some defeats, 
they were able to face, to beat, to conquer all their enemies. 
Europe was subdued; a splendid despotism, from Russia to 
Spain, erected on the ruins of those powers who well de- 
served their fate, and the face of affairs so reversed, that 
England, in her turn, had to stand alone, the combined hos- 
tility of the world. 



13 Chap. i. 

She was saved by her naval force, and insular situation, 
and her people certainly displayed a constancy which, had the 
origin of the contest been of a purer and more liberal nature, 
would have reflected immortal glory on her name. But 
the cry for strengthening the government was stronger than 
ever, the most alarming encroachments upon the liberty 
of the subject and purity of the constitution, were viewed 
with indifference — the end sanctified the means. The go- 
vernment availed itself fully of the occasion, and laid the 
foundation of a military despotism, perhaps as formidable to 
the exterior, but certainly as well calculated to overpower all 
opposition of the people at home, as that of the great ruler 
of France. The faults of Napoleon, that cooled the French 
in his cause, and inspired the subject nations with the desire 
and hope of retrieving their liberty; his disasters in 1812 and 
181.3, the combined efforts of Europe, at length overturned 
his colossal power, and closed at least for the present the 
bloody and brilliant scene of the revolution. 

And what has been the result ? England, like France, has 
become a military power ; she has subverted her rival, and 
crowned her arms with military fame. But she has lost, 
perhaps irretrievably lost, that character and those institu- 
tions which made her greatness and her glory. Or rather 
under an improved form and better auspices, they have emi- 
grated across the Atlantic. 

The world in general is scarcely yet aware of the total 
change which has taken place in the character of England, 
in her constitution, and in the relative rank which she holds 
amongst nations. England was a rich, industrious, free and 
enlightened country; her manufactures, trade and agricul- 
ture were equally flourishing, and she was strong by her navy, 
her opulence, and the proud, firm and independent character 
of her people. Her army was insignificant both in its num- 
bers and quality, (2) vide note 2; but the bravery and pa- 
triotism :>f her citizens secured her against foreign invasion. 



Chap. i. 14 

The yoke of the English weighed heavy upon the countries 
subject to them ; they were cruel and harsh masters, and arro- 
gant and overbearing to strangers ; there was a great deal of 
corruption in their government, but it had not spread uni- 
versally amongst the middling and lower classes. ~ 

Exteriorly, England had little or no influence, and when 
the government attempted to interfere in the contests of con- 
tinental Europe, their measures were generally unpopular. 
A blind and rooted hatred against France was the only senti- 
ment which sometimes roused the passions of the people, 
and turned them aside from their true interests, peace, com- 
merce and industry. Jealous of their small military estab- 
lishment, they carefully kept it down, and the only part they 
took in European wars, was by assisting with subsidies those 
sovereigns, who courted them for that purpose in the most 
humble style. 

At present, since the blind passions of the people have 
enabled the government to form a powerful army, they have 
actively interfered in all the contests and interests of Europe, 
and with Russia, direct the whole machine of its political 
system. British blood has been poured as prodigally as Na- 
poleon poured that of the French ; British armies have ap- 
peared in every quarter of the world, and their empire has 
spread over the globe in every direction. The influence of 
the cabinet of St. James has been uniformly exerted to put 
down the spirit of liberty and improvement, and Saxony, Genoa, 
Italy, Poland, Norway, as well as France, have been press- 
ed under its iron weight, or betrayed by its fallacious pro- 
mises. In Spain it has supported Ferdinand and the inquisi- 
tion. In short, England is no longer the proud and indepen. 
dent country she was ; like that of all the great empires that 
have successively appeared in the world, her government is 
oppressive and despotic at home, ambitious, grasping and ra- 
pacious abroad. — England was considered as the bulwark of 
liberty; she is become one of its chief oppressors. 



15 Chap. i. 

The change which has taken place in the interior, is not at. 
first visible to the cursory view of a traveller. The high and 
finished state of the cultivation, the beauty, luxury, and opu- 
lence which shine all around, the immense profusion of wealth, 
the perfection of the manufactures, the busy bustle of trade, 
the ingenious and universal application of machinery to every 
useful purpose, and the prodigies which it effects, give to the 
whole country an appearance of unparalleled plenty and 
prosperity. But a very little observation discloses the me- 
lancholy fact, that all this is forced and artificial. Such is the 
weight of the taxes and charges, that without the most inces- 
sant activity, labour, and industry, the people must starve. 
Anxious about their very existence, they are grown callous 
and indifferent on every other subject; and delicacy, honour 
and principle, love and regard for liberty, proper pride and 
independence of character, the honest peculiarity of the old 
Englishman, are almost lost in the exclusive and universal 
ardour for gain. The precariousness of the means of liveli- 
hood in all the industrious classes is inconceivable; the far- 
mer, trader, and manufacturer live on their capital, the la- 
bouring poor are in a state of the most abject misery and dis- 
tress, and the number of paupers and criminals has conse- 
quently augmented in such a frightful ratio, that it baffles cal- 
culation and passes belief. 

The corruption of the administration, and its prodigality 
and tyranny, from the ministry, great sinecure placemen, 
and borough-mongers, down to the tax-gatherer, excisemen, 
tytheman and spy, their arbitrary measures, the suspension 
of the habeas-corpus act, and consequently of the liberty of 
the press, the national debt, the abuses of the banking sys- 
tem, and multiplication of forgeries, the multiplication of 
poor-rates, pauperism and crimes, have been too ably and too 
frequently exposed to require any comments upon them here. 
Loaded with debt, and corrupted to the very core, the peo- 
ple and government of England are, at this day, the most 
profligate and unprincipled as well as the most powerful and 



Chap. t. 16 

splendid in the world. They are miserable and unsatisfied, 
under all their greatness, and must be so under every change 
of situation. War cannot make them worse, peace cannot 
make them better. Loud as the public misery made them 
call for peace at the close of the late contest, a most nume- 
rous and influential party wish again at this day for war, be- 
cause they did not find in the cessation of hostilities those be- 
nefits which they expected, because, great as were the 
charges of war, it gave them a monopoly of trade, which they 
are fast losing, and because the rising industry of other nations 
is entering in competition with theirs, and requires to be stopt. 

Such is the present situation of England, such is the result of 
the old clamour of the infatuated people, France must be put 
down, government must be strengthened. France hasbeen put 
down, and England is reduced, at least, at home, very nearly 
to the situation of France some time before the revolution. On 
the ruins of her independence and of her principle, is raised 
the enormous edifice of the executive power and military 
despotism. But the world, we repeat it, and the people of 
America in particular, are not aware on what a military power 
that despotism is founded — nor of the complete change which 
lias taken place in the military system of that country. It is 
well known that in the last war, her armies were prodigiously 
augmented, that they were actively thrown in the contest, 
that one great general like another Marlborough appeared at 
their head, and that a number of able officers were formed 
under him; that they obtained splendid victories, and con- 
jointly with the other nations of Europe overturned the em- 
pire and military ascendency of France. This, however, is 
not all, and those who are aware of no greater change, when 
they see successive acts passed for reducing the numbers of 
the army, think that every thing is gradually returning into 
its ordinary channel. — But it must be observed : 

1st. That a military spirit has been created in the nation, 
almost as universal as it was in France under Napoleon. 



17 Chap. i. 

The uniform has become fashionable and honourable, in a 
country where no drum was allowed to be beaten in the city 
of London, and every young man, if he does not enter the 
army or navy, aspires at least to belong to some militia, 
volunteer or yeomanry corps. 

2d. That military services are become the surest road to 
titles, honours and dignities. A number of peerages have 
been distributed in the army, and the order of the Bath, or- 
ganized on the model of the legion of honour; an innovation 
for which Walpole or North might have lost their heads. 

3d. The composition of the army has been greatly ame- 
liorated. The venality which disgraced the administration of 
the Duke of York in the time of the famous Mrs. Clarke 
has been corrected. Although promotions by purchase or 
family interest still exist in the subaltern ranks, yet a number 
of able officers have risen by service or seniority in the last 
war, and the government has an ample choice of subjects to 
fill all high and commanding posts. The artillery and engi- 
neers will hereafter be exclusively recruited with instructed 
officers from the military schools. The discipline, the arma- 
ment of the troops, their clothing and equipment, have been 
equally ameliorated on the model of the French army. 

4th. A good staff has been organized. That service w a 
in its infancy in Britain at the beginning of the war, and was 
organized in its present form by some French emigrant offi- 
cers, Messrs. Tromelin, Phelippeaux, &c. That staff is care- 
fully maintained. 

5th. It may be seen from the work of Mr. Dupin, with what 
sedulous care and attention the British government maintain 
and improve all their military and naval establishments, how 
they have organized and keep in readiness for action the 
most complete, effective, and numerous materiel, that was 

3 



Chap, t 18 

ever possessed by a military power, and what importance 
they attach to the diffusion and improvement of military edu- 
cation, principally in the corps of their engineers and 
artillery. This improvement can scarcely yet be perceived. 
Many years must elapse after the creation of military schools, 
before their influence can be felt in the army. The old offi- 
cers, however uninstructed and inefficient, cannot be displaced 
to put young men in their room. The polytechnic school 
in France has scarcely yet exerted a sensible influence on 
the improvement of those branches of the military pro- 
fession, which it was destined to recruit, and which indeed 
were already carried to a high state of perfection before the 
revolution by the fostering care of the government since the 
days of Louis XIV. The British engineers, on the contrary, 
ranked very low in the estimation of the best judges, but their 
government is forming the elements of a new corps in their 
military schools. Their artillery is better. 

6th. Although the British government have disbanded some 
corps of infantry and cavalry which they can easily recruit 
again ; although to satisfy the clamours of the reformers and 
economize their finances, they may disband some more, yet 
they carefully keep up their military institutions, and a mass 
of troops sufficient to awe any opposition at home, and in 
case of war, to embody in their ranks any number of recruit? 
and communicate to them their spirit and their discipline. 
I do not exactly know the present force of the British army. 
But without including their colonial service in the East Indies, 
in Africa and America, I believe the whole mass of their 
European troops of all kinds, will not be found under 200 
battalions of foot and 200 squadrons of horse, a force more 
than sufficient for these purposes. And if the exclusive devo- 
tion of these troops to the government that pays them, and 
from which they expect recompenses and promotion, if their 
total indifference to public spirit and patriotism be doubted, 
let it be remembered how easily they have been turned oiii 
against the people on recent occasions. 



19 Chap. i. 

However strongly the power of the British government 
may be built on such an army, and on such a navy, they do not 
exclusively rely upon them. In the first place the very 
abuses of their administration, its prodigality, and the num- 
ber of people who live on the interest of the national debt, 
have intimately connected with their cause a great mass of 
the population, who must stand or fall with them. The 
ramifications of political corruption reach to the lowest ranks 
of society. In the next place, the splendour and brillian- 
cy of their successes have attached to them a numerous class, 
who forget the loss of their liberty, dazzled by the external 
glory to which the British name has been raised. With a 
parliament composed, organized and drilled as the British 
parliament is at this day ; with such a mass of ready instru- 
ments in such a needy and unprincipled population ; with 
such an army and such a navy at the disposition of govern- 
ment, what is become of English liberty ? It is time for other 
nations to look to theirs. For what will that government do 
with the military force and spirit which they have created. 
France was obliged, in the same circumstances, to keep her 
army employed in foreign war and conquest. 

Let it not be imagined that the financial embarrassments of 
Britain will prevent her from following that course. Whatever 
be the distress of the people, whatever ruin war may bring upon 
them, the government are taking another ground, and render- 
ing themselves independent of its support. If they create so 
numerous a class, exclusively devoted to their interests ; if they 
can only secure enough to pay and maintain a force that will 
keep down the people, what need the ministry care for their 
murmurs, their distress, and their ruin. When their army ac- 
quires the same superiority over the other armies of Europe 
which the French possessed in the time of Napoleon ; when 
their navy surpasses the collected naval force of the rest oi 
the world, they need no longer subsidize foreign nations; they 
can even abridge their means and liberty, their industry and 
trade, draw contributions from them, and support their own 
forces at their expense. — (3) vide note 3. 



Chap. r. 20 

This forced, artificial and unnatural situation, cannot how- 
ever last long. Despotism and corruption universally pro- 
duce decay. In losing her liberty and her principles, England 
has lost her real strength and her real glory, and exchanged 
them for the vain and momentary blaze of military fame and 
usurping empire ; an empire not founded on the love and re- 
spect of nations, but on force ; an empire which can only be 
supported by force, and must fall some day or other by the 
same means that raised it. She has already lost on the con- 
tinent of Europe, that veneration which accompanied her name 
when it was always linked with the ideas of freedom, justice 
and sound policy. Like the statue of Nebuchadnezzar, 
the splendid edifice of her despotism is topped with gold, 
armed with brass and iron, but reposes on a foundation of 
sand and of clay. When founded only on a military force, 
however excellent, numerous and well appointed, every 
power is subject to the chances of fortune. An awful exam- 
ple has lately shown to the world in what an instant such an 
edifice may be crushed. And melancholy indeed will be the 
situation of England in such a case ; her riches, her industry, 
her wealth and prosperity, her principles gone ; her people 
impoverished and corrupted, lost to all delicacy, scruple, and 
morality, and accustomed to luxury and profusion. There is 
certainly an immense mass of information, of talent, of 
science and industry in England ; but, as in France, all these 
qualities will have been exclusively applied to the service of 
the government, or all who join talent to honesty will have 
emigrated long before. 

How much more respectable was the name of England, 
how much more solid her power, when with a small army, a 
navy scarcely equal to that of the Dutch, but a government 
strong by the support of a free, energetic, and enlightened 
people, she stood the bulwark of European liberty, against the 
ambition of Louis XIV. Under all her apparent greatness, 
she is really weaker in the love of her people for theircountry, 
in their moral courage and principle, than she was thirty years 



21 Chap. i. 

ago. Thus, when the power of Napoleon stretched from Cadiz 
to Moscow, when a million of armed veterans stood at his 
command, and the treasures of Europe were at his disposal, 
France was really weaker, as was proved by the event, than 
when confined between Belgium and the Pyrenees, divided at 
home, without an army, without a navy, without finances, al- 
most without a government ; but animated by the young en- 
thusiasm of hope, and the love of liberty. 

But it must be remembered, that before the catastrophe of 
Moscow, the power of Napoleon had repeatedly crushed all 
opposition from the frontiers of Spain to those of Russia. 
It had risen to its acme, just before its fall, and no human 
foresight could have fixed the moment of its decline. In the 
same way England can do incalculable mischief in the world 
before she falls. 

It behoves America, for her own sake, for the sake of that 
world where she stands the last and only asylum of liberty and 
of its friends and martyrs in every country; the sanctuary, 
where the flame of freedom is yet cherished and kept alive, 
to watch the progress and march of this great power, a power 
infinitely greater than that of Napoleon. The jealousy of 
England is chiefly directed against her. The English know 
right well, that their naval supremacy, on which their greatness 
depends, has ultimately more to fear from America, than from 
the rest of the world. They cannot reach to the sources of 
her prosperity, nor finally prevent her progress ; it depends 
on causes which it is not in the power of England, nor even 
of man, to change ; on her geographical position, her immense 
territory, her free government, and the enlightened character 
of her people. But they can stop it for a time ; they can give 
it severe checks, and it behoves America to stand upon her 
guard. 

To prove these positions, to show the necessity of organizing 
an efficient defensive force in America, and to point out some 



Chap. i. 22 

of the principles on which such a force should be founded, 
such are the objects of the present Essay. I am aware that 
the very examples which I have just quoted, of France and of" 
England, who both lost their liberties by over-augmenting 
that military force, which they had been obliged to raise for 
purposes of self-defence; I am aware that these examples 
may be turned against me, and that they have excited a very 
just and proper alarm in this free country. But that the situa- 
tion of America is radically different from that of France or 
England, and that her military force, founded on different 
principles, and differently composed and organized, can never 
endanger her liberties, even when improved and strengthened 
so as to protect her effectually, I shall also endeavour to prove* 



CHAPTER II. 



Refutation of the popular opinion of the Americans concerning 
the late war — Military Analysis of that nar, and of the prin- 
ciples on which it was conducted. 

Before we enter into a review of the defensive preparations 
which are become requisite in this country, to guard against 
the overgrown power of Britain, it will be necessary to correct 
some erroneous estimations of our actual strength, grounded 
on our success in the last war. '« Whatever be the resources 
of England, we need not fear her;'' such is the popular and 
common cry, " We fairly tried, and repelled them." But, 
if success, and even glorious success, in a noble cause, inspires 
us with too much presumption, and too great a confidence in 
our own means; if it makes us undervalue those of our ene- 
mies, it is sometimes more mischievous than a defeat. 

Far be it from me to detract from the just fame of those 
brave soldiers, who so proudly supported the honour of the 
American flag. Their success was as glorious as it was unex- 
pected by the rest of the world ; it gave a great check to the 
presumption of Britain, and taught her to estimate at a higher 
rate, the means and character of America. But the military 
forces of Britain are improved, and are still improving since 
that time, and during that war she did not really exert them, 
as we shall prove by a short analysis. In hazarding, however, 
an opinion upon the military operations of the British and 
American armies, I necessarily speak with diffidence. Em- 
ployed in active service in the distant wars of Europe, which 
engaged all my feelings and attention at the time, I cannot 
pretend to judge of the local and political interests which 



Chap, h. 24 

may have swayed the governments and chiefs on either side. 
To those who were at a distance, and not in the secret, their 
movements appeared strange and unsystematical ; but I can 
only pretend to ground my opinions upon public documents, 
and geographical positions. 

When the American war broke out, the vast edifice of the 
French empire, that menaced the very existence of Britain, 
was beginning to give way, and the nations of Europe to rise 
in arms and assist in overturning it: they all required British 
subsidies, and all the energy and inspiration that Britain coul 
give to them (4) vide note 4; her armies, gradually formed during 
the Spanish war, were poured in the peninsula, or in Belgium, 
to join in the contest ; her navy, ruling from the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean, not only enforced a strict blockade round the 
French dominions, but formed a line of communication, to 
connect every attack, and convey troops, stores, and ammu- 
nition to every point at once, from Venice and Sicily, to Riga, 
Hamburgh, and Holland. When, under these circumstances, 
the resolution of the Americans was known, the British cabi- 
net could scarcely be persuaded, that their long patience 
under insults and injuries of all kinds, was at length subdued, 
or that they would declare war upon Britain at the very 
moment in which the scale was turning in her favour. Her 
colonies in America were quite unprovided ; a few battalions 
of regulars with the Canadian militia, whose fidelity wavered, 
were the only defence of her northern possessions, a few 
irigates blockaded the coast, from the station of Halifax, and 
pressed by closer and more important cares in Europe, she 
could spare but a very small proportion of her means to occupy 
the Americans at home. The inferiority of these forces obliged 
rhe English to stand on the defensive in Canada, whilst their 
irigates might operate some diversions on the coast of the 
United States. In this they were singularly assisted by the 
geographical character of that country, and the unwillingness 
with which the New England states appear to have entered in 
(he contest. 



25 Chap. ij. 

The thinly scattered population of Canada is disseminated 
on a long and single line from Lake Huron along the shores of 
Erie, Ontario and the St. Lawrence, to a little distance be- 
low Quebec. That country has but one open communica- 
tion with Britain, by the mouth of the last mentioned river, 
for though hereafter a communication may be opened with 
Hudson's Bay, the intervening country is at present desert, 
and no military operation could be directed on that line. 
That communication is covered by the colonies of Nova 
S iotia, Newfoundland, Isle Royale, Cape Breton, which 
" as advanced barriers and depots to the more im- 
portant province of Canada, and secured by its capital, 
Quebec, a regularly fortified city which stands at its only 
entry. All military means in men, arms, money, ammunition, 
stoics of all kinds, must be conveyed through that city, and 
up the St. Lawrence to Montreal, before they can be distri- 
buted through the province. 

From Montreal extends a double communication, the one 
along the St. Lawrence to the Ontario, the other up the Uta- 
was ; but I am ignorant how far the second, which is the great 
channel of the fur trade, may be used as a military commu- 
nication with Lake Huron. It would certainly be a very fa- 
tiguing route for an army to ascend its numerous rapids, draw- 
ing or poling their boats all the way, against the current. 

From this simple view, it is evident that the object of every 
invader of Canada should be to seize upon Quebec or Mon- 
treal, after which the rest of the province must fall of course. 
Quebec may be attacked by sailing up the St. Lawrence 
(this was the route pursued by Wolfe in 1 759), or by descend- 
ing that rivet from Montreal, or by a difficult march up (he 
Kennebeck, and through the desert which separates the 
district of Maine from Lower Canada. This was the route 
which the brave and then honest Arnold traced with such glory 
and difficulty in 1775. 

Montreal is still more immediately exposed to attack, cither 

4 



Chap, u 26 

by descending the St. Lawrence through the rapids, from 
Brownsville and Sacket's Harbour (this was the route of 
Gen. Wilkinson in 1813), or by descending from Lake Cham- 
plain directly on the island in which it is situated (this was 
the route of Lord Amherst in 1760, and of Montgomery in 
1 775). Montreal is not fortified, and Quebec is not calculated 
to make a long and serious defence against a regular attack, 
scientifically conducted. 

From the same view, it is apparent, that the object of the 
possessors of Canada, unless they have a great superiority of 
forces, will always be to turn the direction of war out of that 
channel and transfer it to the lakes and back settlements of 
the Americans. Thus did the marquis of Montcalm, the 
ablest genera! that ever fought in America, operate in 1756 
and 1757. The British forces in Canada were very insigni- 
ficant in the last war. They would have been overwhelmed 
by a direct attack, on that plain and simple line of operations 
which is indicated by the nature of the country, the example 
of preceding generals, and the expedition planned by Wash- 
ington at the very beginning of the revolutionary war; hosti- 
lities would have been closed on the northern frontier in a few 
weeks, and it would be worth comparing the probable ex- 
pense both of blood and of treasure, which such an expedi- 
tion might have cost, with what was expended in the three, 
campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814. 

Why (liis was not done, must have been from local and po- 
litical reasons, of which a military writer cannot pretend to 
judge. Perhaps from the fear of hurting the prospects and in- 
terests of some states who apprehended that the St. Lawrence 
might afford a new channel for the products of the west ; 
perhaps, from the fear of drawing on America the whole force 
of Britain, a part of the nation may have been averse to thecon- 
quest of Canada. It appears, besides, that America was as 
unprepared for the contest as Britain. After thirty years of 
peace, there existed no military establishments nor institutions 



27 €hap. it. 

in that country ; an army was hastily formed and organized at 
great expense, but generals, officers, men, and administra- 
tors were equally inexperienced. Before they could be 
armed, equipped, disciplined and put in motion, the govern- 
ment was obliged to rely upon the voluntary exertions of the 
people. Unfortunately the eastern states, whose local 
situation, numerous, hardy and active population, and well 
appointed militia, would have enabled them to have made 
the most effectual exertions on the most essential point, re- 
fused to co-operate in the cause of their countrymen, and the 
people of the western states, Pennsylvania, and New- York, 
were the only portion of the nation on whom the government 
could rely for prompt and voluntary aid. In consequence, the 
Americans were obliged to follow the lead of the enemy, and 
pursue the very march which he designated to them ; attack 
his line at its very extremity, and proceed down step by 
step. It is evident that they must thereby have found him 
stronger and stronger at every post, and during so long and 
tedious a march through so wretched a country, afford him 
full time to receive all his reinforcements. 

That to make them follow this course was the plan of the 
British commanders in Canada during the two first campaigns 
of 1812 and 1813, a short analysis of these campaigns will 
demonstrate. Although they were not men of distinguished 
reputation, their conduct of the war does credit to their 
military views and capacity. While they amused the Ameri- 
can government with negotiations, their first step was to des- 
patch Colonel Proctor, with a small corps of regulars, to raise 
the militia of Upper Canada and invade the territory of Michi- 
gan, whilst another corps was sent by Lake Huron to cany 
Michilimakinac. Fleets were equipped on the lakes, and all 
the N. W. Indians roused to arms; an operation premedita- 
ted and preconcerted long before, by intrigues with their chiefs 
and prophets, especially with the celebrated Tecumseh. The 
Americans, on their side, with an army raised in Ohio, inva- 
ded Upper Canada, but after displaying a great deal of use- 



Chap. ii. 28 

less and misdirected valour, were attacked at Detroit by an 
inferior force, and from the inconceivable weakness or cow- 
ardice of their chief, General Hull, laid down their arms and 
surrendered the whole territory of Michigan; The western 
states were laid open to the merciless ravages of a savage 
enemy. These misfortunes were at length redeemed by the 
bravery and good conduct of Generals Harrison, Cass, John- 
son, Governor Shelby of Kentucky (whose patriotic devo- 
tion deserves to be eternally recorded by a grateful country), 
by the valour of the young and heroic Croghan, the naval vic- 
tory of the immortal Perry, and the spirit of the people of the 
western states, who rose en masse to repel the invaders. 
The Americans recovered Michigan, obtained complete pos- 
session of Lake Erie, destroyed their Indian foes, conquered 
a portion of Upper Canada, and repelled the British to Lake 
Ontario and the Niagara frontier. These exploits were glo- 
rious, no doubt, but what did they cost, and what was their 
result. To protect against 2000 or 3000 British and Indians, 
a vast country, containing several hundred thousand souls, 
two armies were raised at the most extravagant expense (for 
in valuing the cost of a militia army, we should include the 
loss of time, of professional duties, the private costs of 
each man) ; one was annihilated, and all its stores, artillery, 
and ammunition, were lost ; a fleet was built on the lakes. 
Two whole campaigns, from July, 1812, to November, 1813, 
were spent in accomplishing these objects imperfectly, for at the 
conclusion of the second campaign, Upper Canada was 
evacuated and Michilimakinac was not even recovered. 

The British, on their side, by that able diversion, at the 
slightest possible trouble and expense, not only threw the 
whole western territory into a most dreadful state of alarm 
and confusion, and put the whole nation to a very great ex- 
pense, but drew all the forces and attention of the Americans 
from the real and proper object of their attack to the most 
distant point. Their system was, what we call in the military 
language of Europe, an offensive defence. Unable to make 



29 Chap. ii. 

any powerful impression on the territory of an enemy much 
superior to them in strength and resources, their object was 
to make him waste that strength and exhaust those resources 
on points of no importance, and prevent him from closing 
with them in those where the contest would have been deci- 
ded at once. 

The state of New- York had also entered with activity in 
the war. From 1812, the American forces, collected on 
Niagara river, made, during the rest of the season, several 
very ill-directed attempts to land on the other side. The 
conduct of the militia gave an additional proof, if any were 
wanted, of the inefficiency of such troops to stand a whole 
campaign in the field. (1) In 1813 mutual surprises and 
small affairs of no importance occupied both parties till the 
month of November. But in those affairs the Americans 
were acquiring experience and steadiness, and displayed a 
great deal of firmness and valour in the combats of York, 
Sacket's Harbour, Stony-Creek, &c. All this valour was 
however uselessly displayed, and the expenditure in men and 
money, the efforts made by land and water to obtain pos- 
session of the lakes and rivers of Upper Canada, were 
thrown away in a wrong direction. For what purpose the 
Americans showed themselves so eager to obtain possession of 
that Niagara frontier during the whole war, is difficult to 
guess. It secured no military advantages whatsoever, and 
without the possession of the lake, did not even cover New- 
York against invasion. The British very willingly and pro- 
perly endeavoured to fix their attention upon it, and disputed 
it over and over with the greatest animosity and perseve- 
rance. It is to be remarked, that both in 1813 and 1814 the 
Americans evacuated the British lines voluntarily, after ob- 
taining possession of them at a great cost of blood and 
ire. 

In November, 1813, General Wilkinson invaded Lower 

(1) Vice on that subject, Washingten's letters, in ever}' page of them, 
especially in 1775 and 177«> 



Chap. ii. 30 

Canada. I cannot pretend to judge of the causes from 
whence his two expeditions failed' in 1813 and 1814; his ad- 
ministrative service must have been very imperfectly orga- 
nized, and have delayed and embarrassed all his movements. 
But these expeditions were certainly the only offensive ope- 
rations undertaken during the whole war with a proper mili- 
tary object in view. The possession of Lower Canada se- 
cures the possession of Upper Canada; but after the much 
more difficult conquest of Upper Canada, Lower Canada 
remains to be subdued. The forces which had fought on the 
Detroit and Niagara frontiers were collected for that expedi- 
tion, and afterwards divided between Plattsburg and Niagara. 

To conclude the abstract of these two campaigns, we shall 
observe, that in the south the Indians were roused to arms, 
through the connivance of the Spanish government of 
Florida and the intrigues of the British, with the view of 
alarming the western states, keeping them occupied at home, 
and putting them to as much trouble andexpenseontheirsouth- 
ern frontier, as they had been put to on their northern frontier 
in the beginning of the war. This diversion proved useful 
to America in the end, as during the arduous struggle which 
it occasioned, that army and that general, whose untutored 
but vigorous genius decided the last great victory of the 
Americans, acquired those habits of patience and discipline 
which secured it. 

The naval contests of the two nations do not properly 
enter into my subject. I shall only observe, that the British 
government had greatly undervalued the naval means of 
America, and the courage and talents of her officers and 
seamen. Their force was in consequence insufficient for 
blockading the coast, and Hull, Rogers, Porter, Decatur, 
Jones, &c. were crowned with glory at the very outset of the 
war. Animated by their example, the American privateers 
swarmed over the ocean, their flag was victorious on every 
sea, and they did real and great mischief to the trade of 
England, even on her own proud coasts. The fame of the 



31 Ch 



\p. ii. 



American navy was ably supported during the whole war, by 
the brave and unfortunate Lawrence, and a crowd of other 
heroes. In 1813 the British began to be aware of the 
importance of the contest ; they blockaded the American 
harbours, but could not prevent our privateers from fre- 
quently slipping out and severely annoying their trade. A 
small armament sailed up the Chesapeak, and its piratical de- 
predations will long be remembered in this country. They 
put the Americans to great trouble and expense, in guarding 
the long and indented coast of that bay, where every point 
is equally exposed to the attack of a central enemy. But 
the brutality and ferocity of their conduct at Hampton, Elk- 
town, and Havre de Grace, forms a strong contrast with the 
generous and humane spirit which was uniformly displayed by 
the Americans. 

At the close of 1 8 1 4, the war took another character. The 
fall of Napoleon enabled England to dispose of her naval and 
military forces, and turn her attention to America. But it 
must be observed, that to restore her finances, her trade and 
manufactures, toput some order in heradministration, to guard 
against popular discontents and satisfy the popular clamour, 
now as loud against war as it was formerly in its favour, a uni- 
versal peace, at least for some time, was become necessarj'. 
In fact, negotiations had already begun with America for that 
purpose, and the congress of Ghent was opened in August to 
settle its conditions. As both parties had agreed to waive the 
discussion of some delicate points, no material difficulty 
could arise in the course of these debates. 

But the trade of England had suffered severely, her arms 
had received some checks, her naval character was diminished, 
and she wished, before the conclusion of peace, to strike some 
severe blows, retrieve the credit of the war, terrify the Ameri- 
cans, by a display of the mischief which she might do, chastise 
what she termed their presumption, and, perhaps, force upon 



Chap. ii. 32 

them some harder conditions of peace. The British were 
not aware that, during the war, several brave and able generals 
had been formed on the American side, that the troops of the 
republic had acquired a great deal of steadiness and discipline : 
they undervalued the strength of their enemy, an error which 
will probably not be repeated. At the same time, by a very 
impolitic measure, they extended their hostilities to the New 
England states, which they had cautiously spared till that mo- 
ment. By these ill-timed measures, they began to offend even 
their partisans, and more signal insults soon roused against 
ihem every American spirit, and destroyed, it is hoped for 
ever, thein influence on any part of the American population. 

From thirty to forty thousand men, between May and Octo- 
ber, were successively despatched and collected in Halifax, 
Canada, Bermuda, Jamaica, &c. to invade the most distant 
points of the American territory. There was no concert 
between these expeditions, they had no views of settlement 
or conquest ; their only object was to plunder, ravage, and 
destroy. In July, hostilities recommenced with fresh vigour 
on the Niagara frontier ; the forces on both sides varied be- 
tween 2000 and 5000 men, but if the contest app'ears unim- 
portant, both from the smallness of these forces, and the 
little possible result of any operations in that quarter, it was 
highly creditable to the spirit of the American troops, and of 
their brave commanders, Brown, Scott, M'Ree, Ripley,Porter, 
Miller, Jessup, &c. who displayed equal energy and fortitude 
in the battles of Chippeway, Niagara, and the brilliant sortie 
of Fort Erie, which concluded the campaign. At the close 
of the season, both parties resumed their former stations, and 
the Americans again evacuated the British territory. 

In September, the mass of the British forces in Canada, 
amounting to 14000 men, descended on Plattsburg: probably 
with the view of destroying the military stores of the Ame- 
ricans, and ravaging the country as far as Albany; for as no si- 
multaneous attack was directed against New- York, it does not 



33 Chap. ilj 

appear that they intended to pursue the course in which Bur- 
goyne lost his army, in 1777. Whatever were these views, 
they were defeated by the glorious victory of Commodore 
Macdonough, and the brave resistance of General Macomb. 
The total destruction of their fleet rendered their farther 
progress impracticable, and they retreated in confusion and 
disorder before a handful of militia. 

In August, the small armament that had committed with 
zmpunity such ravages in the Chesapeak, was reinforced by 
Admiral Cochrane, and General Ross; the defeat of the Ame- 
ricans, at Bladensburgh, afforded a new example of the in- 
sufficiency of militia to stand in the field against the manoeu- 
vres of regular troops ; the destruction of Washington was a 
wanton insult, which rendered more service to the American 
cause than a victory. The attack on Baltimore could have 
no object but plunder and devastation, and its failure closed 
the war in that quarter. The troops employed in that dis- 
graceful service, were then directed to co-operate in the grand 
and final attack on New-Orleans. 

That the British, by these expeditions, only intended to 
chastise the Americans before the conclusion of peace, by the 
destruction of their chief cities, and the devastation of their 
private property, is proved by the fact, that peace was actually 
signed at Ghent, on the 24th December, 1814, only one day 
after the first attack of General Jackson on the British van- 
guard, and without any reference to the New-Orleans expe- 
dition. This expedition was fortunately as ill conducted in 
its execution, as cruel and infamous in its purpose. The point 
of attack was ill selected ; an overwhelming force moved for- 
wards with such slow, cautious, and timid steps, that time was 
given for the Americans to make their preparations. The 
decided, intrepid character of the American general, his good 
selection of the point of defence, the judgment he showed in 
throwing up intrenchments before his inexperienced troops, 
the skill of the cannoneers, the patient, cool, and firm valour of 

6 



Chap. ii. M 

the Tennessee volunteers, formed in a laborious and severe 
warfare with the Indians, the patriotic bravery and enthusiasm 
of the less experienced militia, the sure aim of the rifles, and 
the presumption of the enemy, whose last attack was as rash 
as his former movements had been tedious and dilatory, did 
the rest. Above all, that ruling providence, which, on this 
occasion, protected the cause of freedom and justice, against ra- 
pine and violence, decided the victory, and closed the eventful 
history of the war, by this signal triumph. 

From the review of this whole war, it cannot be too strong- 
ly insisted upon — 

1st. That during the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and the be- 
ginning of 1814, the English, who had very few forces in 
America, and could not spare more, endeavoured only to ha- 
rass the Americans on as many points as possible, and make 
them expend their blood and treasure on objects of no im- 
portance. 

2d. That when they Seriously took the offensive in 1814, 
they harl already decided on a peace, which was necessary to 
them, and only aimed at deterring the Americans from another 
contest, by first making them feel the evils of war. But 
they took no measures for making a deep or permanent im- 
pression on the country. 

3d- That they were not aware of the excellent quality of 
the American navy, of the improvements which had taken 
place in their army during the war, nor of the spirit and re- 
sources of the country in general, and had formed an erro- 
neous and exaggerated idea of its party divisions. Their last 
expeditions were generally ill planned and ill conducted. 

4th. That their efforts in the last war are therefore not to 
be taken as the measure of their strength. They know at 
present, they feel the importance of America; they are aware 



35 Chap. ii. 

that she is rapidly growing their rival on the seas, and sup- 
planting them with still greater advantages in commerce. 
They are aware that in a few years it will be out of 
their power to put her down. We may depend, there- 
fore, that with a better knowledge of the country and of its 
resources, with an improved army and a much greater dis- 
play of forces, as soon as they are freed from embarrassments 
at home, and at liberty to exert all their means, they will 
seize the first occasion, and leave nothing untried to put 
a stop to the progress of America, wound her in the 
most vital parts, and crush her rising prosperity. That 
such an object, however painful it may be to the proud feel- 
ings of a patriot to acknowledge its practicability, however 
painful to a philosopher and philanthropist to think that it 
could even be conceived, that such an object has been 
tried, is still pursued, and is not absolutely unattainable, we 
shall endeavour to prove in the next chapter. And whether, 
in such a case, it will be prudent in America to remain in the 
same unguarded state in which she was at the beginning of 
the last war, when England had no means to assail her, we 
wtfl leave to the judgment of every reflecting American. 



CHAPTER III 



Development of the principles on which the next contest be- 
tween England and America will probably be conducted, and 
of the chief objects which Britain will then seek to accom- 
plish. 

The result of the last war appears to have lulled the Ameri- 
cans into a state of the most complete security and conn 
dence- The general cry of Britain was, strengthen the go- 
vernment and the army ; we have seen what it has led to in 
that country. The popular cry in America seems to be, 
weaken the government and disband the army. Whether 
the reverse of wrong is right, whether the military establish 
ment of the United States can endanger the public liberty, 
or whether the principle of economy, and the jealousy which 
the individual states entertain of the patronage and power of 
the central government, may not be carried so far as to en- 
danger that public liberty and the general safety, we shall ex- 
amine in another chapter. We shall content ourselves here 
with observing, that the army which had been raised and 
formed in the last war has been disbanded, and that a constant 
outcry has been kept up ever since for reducing and even 
disbanding entirely the small regular force which had been 
retained. 

England on her side has been silently and gradually im- 
proving her military knowledge and her military establish- 
ments. Her unexpected reverses in the last war have turned 
her most serious attention towards America. The other 
powers of Europe may fear her aggrandizement, but they 
fear still more the principles of republicanism, that havcstill 



37 Chap. hi. 

an asylum in this country. As long as Britain maintains her 
present artificial and unnatural power, she must view Ameri- 
ca as her most dangerous enemy. She is aware that she un- 
dervalued its forces in the last war, and that her own expe- 
ditions were ill planned and ill conducted. Since the peace, 
a number of British military and naval officers and engineers 
have visited our frontiers in every direction, and under va- 
rious pretexts. The fact is notorious ; some of them I have 
met, and some of their statistical and military notes I have 
accidentally seen. Whether sent by their government or im- 
pelled by their own private zeal, to reconnoitre a country 
where they soon expect to be employed, the consequences 
are the same, and I am persuaded that there exists at this day 
in the British war office, as complete a series of military me- 
moirs on America as at Washington ; perhaps more complete, 
if we do not preserve with care such documents and mate- 
rials as we possess. That all that information and all those 
means will be directed against us on the first occasion, we 
cannot doubt. The last war was defensive on the part of 
England; she had no object in view; the next will be offen- 
sive, and with a view to break down the resources of Ameri- 
ca, so as to preclude the possibility of her entering again in 
competition with the power of Britain — her blows will be 
3truck home and deep. 

Her first object will be to bring about, if possible, a sepa- 
ration of the states, and to break that union which constitutes 
their strength and their greatness — that union on which the 
character and the standing of America depend. There is 
scarcely an individual, there is certainly no party amongst us 
where the mass of individuals would not shudder at the bare 
possibility of that separation, and of the consequent and in- 
fallible loss of our republican institutions and national inde- 
pendence. But all are not equally aware how the crafty and 
ambitious government of Britain, by heating their passions, 
fomenting their party feuds and divisions, encouraging their 
local feel ; ngs and interests, and entertaining their jealousy of 



Chap. hi. 38 

the federal administration, might gradually accustom their 
minds to the idea. Many there are, who think it hard that 
the local interests of their states should be sacrificed for ge- 
neral measures, which perhaps they disapprove, and which 
may be very hurtful to those very interests ; many who think 
the separate means of such great portions of the empire as 
the eastern or western states, amply sufficient for their wants, 
wishes and defence ; many, who young, ambitious and aspi- 
ring, despair of playing a part on the grand scene of the ge- 
neral union, and expect a freer sphere of action in these 
smaller republics. These people do not aim at a separation, 
they only wish to augment the individual independence and 
influence of their states. They are not aware, that in declaim- 
ing against the danger of usurpation at home, in weakening 
the central government, in gradually dissolving the connect- 
ing links of feeling and interest between the different parts 
of the union, they are unconsciously aiding by that narrow 
and selfish policy, the ambitious designs of England. Divide 
et impera, was ever the motto of all usurpers on the rights of 
a free people, and more especially of England. If we could 
doubt it in this country, let us remember her policy in Europe, 
in France, in India ; let us remember the tale of Henry's ne- 
gotiations, in time of peace, in our own country, and if any 
American could forget it, it should be repeated to him daily, 
taught to every infant with his earliest lessons, and insisted 
upon in every assembly of the people, in every discussion of 
every party. 

The fatal moment which divides the feelings and the inte- 
rests of the people of America, is the last of their liberty here, 
of their consequence abroad, of their republican institutions 
and of all their glorious results, plenty, freedom, and happiness 
at home, and an envied and respectable name in the rest of 
the world. Whatever dangers our liberties may run from one 
good army, organized and directed by a firm general govern- 
ment, and knowing no enemies but the foreign invaders of the 
states, there is no doubt that as soon as two rival armies shall 



30 Chap. hi. 

exist in America, with all the bitter rancour of neighbouring 
enmity, the executive and the military will be strengthened 
on both sides, until, by conquest or usurpation, one or two 
military monarchies be erected. This is confirmed by the 
universal experience of history : in that case, England will be 
freed from any danger of competition from America, for that 
country will have lost the principle of its strength. With 
such an object before them, we need not doubt that the British 
government will neglect nothing to bring it about ; they will 
foment our divisions, manage the interests of some states, 
and bear all their forces upon others, to crush them. 

The second object of England will be to destroy those 
naval and military establishments, which although yet in their 
infancy, bid fair hereafter to rival those of Britain ; to inflict 
deep and deadly wounds on those points where the wealth 
and industry of the nation are concentring ; to ruin its trade, 
destroy its shipping, and put the people to such trouble and 
expense, as besides loading them with taxes and making them 
suffer all the ills of war, may deter them from ever renewing 
a contest with Great Britain, and disgust them perhaps with 
their government and institutions. The English have the 
example of the most free and celebrated nations of antiqui- 
ty, for believing that in a democracy the executive govern- 
ment is usually held responsible for all the sufferings and mis- 
fortunes of the people. 

It is not likely that, in order to accomplish this, they will 
venture any serious invasion into the interior of the con- 
tinent. In the first place, however excellent and disciplined 
the troops employed on such a service might be, they would 
infallibly be destroyed in detail, and the population is so dis- 
seminated in small towns, villages, farms and hamlets, that no 
particular point would be worth the loss and expense of such 
an expedition. The militia, in that case, in every wood, 
marsh and passage, behind every hedge and every wall, with 
their known dexterity in sharp-shooting, would be irresistibly 



Chap. hi. 40 

destructive. In Canada, from the same reasons, they would 
probably adopt the same course of offensive defence, 
which they did in the last war; transfer the scene of hostili- 
ties to the back countries ; rouse the Indians to an active 
diversion against the western states, and send a few auxiliaries 
by water, to support and lead them ; harass with savage war- 
fare the back parts of New- York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, 
Michigan, and thus prevent the inhabitants of the interior from 
supporting those of the coast ; renew a naval contest on 
the lakes, to divide the attention and the forces of the 
Americans, and put them to a useless and extravagant 
expense. They will consider themselves as gainers thereby, 
whatever be the result of that unimportant contest, in which 
victory will not even secure the conquest of Canada. Such 
may be their course in those quarters, but it is not there 
that they can expect to strike any deep or decisive blow. 

It is on the coast, where the population, the naval and mili- 
tary establishments, the wealth, the trade and industry of the 
people are concentred, that such blows will be struck. What 
was the course pursued in the Peninsula by the Duke of 
Wellington? Occupying the impregnable position of Alju- 
barota, he concentred behind it all his means, formed his army 
and organized its service; in front his intrenchments defied 
all the efforts of the enemy ; behind, lay the city and harbour 
of Lisbon, open to all the supplies and reinforcements he 
required. The British navy ruled the sea, and gave him the 
means of attacking whatever point he pleased ; the French 
were obliged to guard themselves on every side, and he wait- 
ed, in secure patience, for any fault which they might commit, 
or any favourable occasion which might present itself. 

Thus on the most central and important points of our coast, 
on those points which cover and connect our great land or water 
communications, our large cities, &c. if they should find some 
spots, so favourably disposed by nature, that in a short time, 
and at a small expense, they may be fortified and isolated from 



41 Chap. hi. 

the continent, an overwhelming combination of naval and 
military forces will be directed to occupy them, and when 
organized on a footing of permanent defence, they will be 
held as regular stations and places of refreshment for the 
troops and navy, grand deposites of all means of hostility 
arms, stores, ammunition, &c. and of all the plunder which will 
be collected in the country, centres of intrigue, bribery and 
conspiracy, &c. Three or four posts of this kind on the coast 
of the United States, connected with the stations of Halifax, 
Bermuda, Jamaica, Lc. would form a strong and powerful 
blockading line round America. If such a blockade required 
10 sail of the line and as many frigates, England could spare 
them, and could not possibly employ them on a more important 
service. Nor is this all. From these centres of destruction, 
as from the focus of so many volcanoes, their predatory par- 
ties will successively assail our arsenals and naval and milita- 
ry establishments, our trading and manufacturing cities, com- 
bine their attacks, shoot out in every direction, carry their 
ravages on every unguarded spot, ascend every river and 
every creek, and force the whole population to remain in a 
constant state of anxiety and alarm, always armed and always 
marching from one point to another. They will be free to 
select their points of attack, and to retire to their boats, 
wherever they meet with resistance, or wherever they have 
accomplished their object. 

Such situations exist in every country, if the'invading gene- 
rals and engineers have knowledge and talent to find them 
out. That in the revolutionary war, the English did not 
succeed in such attempts, is only a proof of the state of in- 
fancy in which the military art was yet in England, at that 
period. Cornwallis, Lord Howe, and several of their most cele- 
brated chiefs, committed the grossest blunders on such occa- 
sions. But if the enemy pursue that course in the next 
war, I shall leave to the judgment of every candid and well 
informed American, whether our navy is yet strong enough to 
oppose them, and what effect would such a harassing system 

6 



Chap. m. 42 

of warfare have on the patience and spirit of the militia. 
Those who know how badly it is organized and equipped, 
those who are acquainted with the confusion and disorder of 
its temporary administration, and how unfit it must be, from its 
very nature and composition, for any long or permanent ser- 
vice, will be able to conceive, but not to calculate, the enor- 
mous trouble and expense which would thus be occasioned, 
and how soon the people would grow weary of the war and of 
their government. Was not this the case in the last war. We 
undertook it to secure some points which we left undecided 
at its close, because a great portion of our people refused to 
co-operate in it any longer, and because a division of our 
union was already apprehended in consequence. The same 
reasons still exist on our side, and stronger reasons on the 
side of Britain, for renewing another contest. 

If we endeavour to find out the chief points of attack, and 
examine for that purpose the military qualities of the vast 
extent of our coasts, we shall observe that, by its geographi- 
cal and military nature, as well as by the political connexions, 
interests and habits of its population, it is divided, from Maine 
to Florida, in three great districts, the northern, the southern 
and the middle or central. A fourth division is formed by the 
coast of the gulf of Mexico, and the mouths of the Alabama, 
Mobile and vast Mississippi, which belongs to our western 
territory. By their military properties the southern shores of 
New-England, from Cape Cod to New- York, should however 
be attached to the middle district, whilst, by their poli- 
tical character and connexions, they belong to the northern 
states. 

If we examine the coast of New-England from Nova Scotia 
to Cape Cod, it will appear, at the first view, that from the 
nature of the dark, foggy and stormy sea, which bathes it, from 
its indented figure, covered with small islands, and intersected 
by ports, creeks, harbours and mouths of rivers, &c. it can 
never be subjected to a strict blockade. From the enterprising 
character and maritime habits of the people, they are admi- 



43 Chap. hi. 

rably fitted to harass the trade of Britain by their numerous 
privateers, who will always find moments for slipping in and 
out, on so extended, and so indented a coast. From the nu- 
merous, concentred, high-spirited, well armed and organized 
population of New-England, where domestic slavery has not 
created a class of domestic enemies ; from the nature of the 
country, mountainous, woody, and barren, intersected with 
streams, rocks, and ravines, mill-sites and natural obstacles of 
all kinds ; from the risk which would be run and the little profit 
which would be reaped, by invading a country where every one 
is active and industrious, but no one opulent, it is not likely 
that New-England will be seriously attacked. Besides, 
whether well founded or not, an idea is generally entertain- 
ed in Britain, that our eastern states are favourable to the 
English interest, disgusted with the spirit and measures of 
the American government, fearful that their influence in the 
union will decline as the western states grow to power and 
preponderance, and consequently less averse from the idea ot 
a separation and from that of forming an independent republic 
under the protection of Britain, than any other part of the 
union. From the combination of all these motives, military 
and political, it is unlikely that the English will direct any 
severe aggressions against that quarter of America. The\ 
will rather manage its interest and foments its discontents. 

However, if New-England takes a more manly and pa- 
triotic and wiser stand, and if Rhode Island be selected for 
the scat of a great national establishment and naval depot, as 
has been announced, it is probable that they will endeavour 
to occupy that noble station, whose advantages were appre 
ciated even at the time of the revolutionary war. The im- 
portance of which that position would be to them in a military 
point of view we shall develope further. In a political point of 
view it would be invaluable as a centre of intrigue, smuggling. 
conspiracy, &c. provided it could be guarded chiefly by a navai 
force, and would not require too great a proportion of land 
troops to protect it. a point which should be ascertained by 
able engineers. By sea a considerable naval force will be re 



Chap, ill 44 

quired to blockade the coast of New-England, notwithstand- 
ing which the American privateers will always find means to 
escape, and retaliate severely for any injury which they may 
receive. Boston is the only place worth being attacked by a 
large expedition. 

fid. In the southern states, from the Chesapeak to the 
extremest point of Florida, other motives will probably deter 
the British from any considerable or permanent invasion : 
the deadliness of the climate to foreign troops, on that low, 
sandy and marshy coast; the want of good naval stations, 
the want of grand marking points of attack, and the dispersed 
state of the agricultural population. Some islands on the 
coast may be occupied as deposites of plunder ; some light 
frigates and flying parties keep the militia in movement and 
alarm ; plantations be destroyed ; the negroes excited to rise, 
and perhaps Charleston or Savannah menaced for the sake 
of plunder, but no serious attempt will be made there. 

3d. The middle coast between Cape Cod and Cape Fear, 
will be the scene of such attempts. That coast, which is so 
admirably adapted by nature to become the seat of a great 
maritime power, forms a long sweeping curve in the very 
centre of the American empire, where four deep bays, plun- 
ging in the heart of the country, convey to its inland territories 
the productions of the exterior. On these are concentrated 
the mass of the wealth, of the population and industry of 
America ; on these are situated her chief national establish- 
ments. Those points, which will certainly attract all the 
efforts and forces of the enemy, are the bay of Rhode Island, 
of New- York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeak. 

For a mere destructive and plundering expedition, New- 
York is the most important object in America ; and if an 
enemy once occupies the heights of Brooklyn, that place is 
untenable. For a great commercial city, when bombs, 
bullets and rockets can reach its ships and stores, cannot be 
expected to sacrifice them ; but New- York requires an army 



45 Chap. hi. 

lo keep it, which might be better employed. This was the 
chief error of the British in the revolutionary war. New-York 
may therefore be plundered or destroyed, but will not be kept 
as a military station, unless the eastern states should again 
adopt the same unwise and unpatriotic course which they did 
in the last war; and separate their interests from those of 
America. In that case, it is not impossible that the plans of 
Burgoyne may be revived, and expeditions directed in concert 
from Canada and Long Island, to conquer the regions border- 
ing on the Hudson, and thus permanently divide the republic 
in two parts. At the close of the revolutionary war, England 
proposed to acknowledge the independence of the other 
states, on condition that she might keep New- York. 

Philadelphia, though a great object of plunder, is even 
more unfit for a military and naval station; its inland situation 
and little defensibility preclude the idea. Besides, the Hud- 
son and Delaware bays, situated in the centre and bottom of 
the great curve which I have described, present no proper 
points of occupation, and would not serve as blockading 
stations. 

It is on the two extremities of this line, on the very points 
which the American government has selected as the seat of 
her naval establishments, on the mouth of the Chesapeak 
bay, and on Rhode Island, that the efforts of Britain will be 
directed. It is there, if they can find proper points, that they 
will fix permanent military and naval stations, such as I have 
described above, and follow the course of hostilities which I 
have mentioned, combine from thence their movements all 
along the coast, and connect them with those of the station? 
of Halifax and Bermuda. 

4th. The western states, forming a world in themselves, 
have little immediately to fear or to hope from Britain; and 
she has no influence amongst them. The feeble hostilities 
of the Indians, those which she may direct against them by 



Chap. nr. 46 

extremity of Canada, any one of these states is strong enough 
to repel ; but from their singular topography, the whole im- 
mensity of regions, watered by the Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, 
Arkansaw, and all their tributaries, have but one natural 
emporium, New-Orleans. The importance of that post, the 
key of the western world, has been already perceived by 
Britain. I have hinted before, that the point of attack was 
ill selected by the British chiefs in the last war : without any 
particular knowledge of the local topography of the neigh- 
bourhood, I had judged so from a simple view of the map. 
I have since had the satisfaction of hearing my opinion con- 
firmed by indisputable authority. But if there should be any 
truth in the report that the Spanish government has proposed 
to cede Cuba to England, or if she should seize that colony 
under any pretext, she need not attack New-Orleans a second 
time. The possession of Havana would secure to her the 
dominion of the gulf of Mexico, and close it so effectually, 
that no ship could possibly pass the channel of Bahama, 
without her permission. And by intercepting from Canada, 
the northern communications of the western states, she might 
lay them under a complete blockade. She will endeavour to 
prevent them, by small diversions and Indian wars, from aiding 
their Atlantic brethren. But we hope that this narrow and 
selfish policy will never be that of our brave backwoodsmen. 
Although behind their forests, they might be secure for the 
present; although the ruin of the maritime states might 
strengthen and enrich them by a vast flood of emigration, yet 
they would eventually fall into dependence on that power, 
which would hold the* coasts, and blockade them at will. The 
consequences of a separation we have already shown. 

By holding severalposts of thatnature, England will prevent 
the different parts of the union from assisting each other ; by 
occupying Rhode Island, she will menace an extent of coun- 
try, that will oblige us to maintain 100,000 men of militia 
under arms to guard it ; a similar station on the Chesapeak 
would have a similar effect ; Havana would immediately 
menace New-Orleans, and completely blockade our southern 



47 Chap. in. 

shores; and, combined with the other stations to Halifax, 
effectually close up the whole of our coasts to all foreign trade. 

If the British find all these important and essential points 
guarded by the Americans, and put in a state of defence ; if 
they find them prepared against an invasion, they will proba- 
bly confine their views to harassing them and putting them 
to trouble and expence. By displaying on our coast a naval 
force calculated to overwhelm all opposition, sending detach- 
ments to hover round it, affecting now and then to disembark 
and form an establishment, till they have roused the country 
and forced the militia to assemble and march in haste, then re- 
embarking and appearing in another point with the same pur- 
pose, they may fatigue our people with perpetual service, and 
force us for every million which they advance, to expend ten 
times as much and more. This, however, is but a small con- 
sideration if we remain true to ourselves, constant and united. 
The Americans should never forget that the object of Britain 
in every contest with them, will be to divide and destroy. 
By repeated destruction, but especially by dividing this noble 
republic and setting its component parts at variance with 
each other, and by these arts alone, can she expect to stop 
its growth, and prevent her own impending ruin. If Ameri- 
ca was once put down, her tyranny and monopoly on the 
seas would meet with no rival, and by that monopoly she 
would extend her haughty and heavy empire over the rest of 
the world. Her pride was deeply hurt by the success of 
the American navy; it was touching her in her vital parts. 
We may therefore count that on the next occasion she will 
endeavour utterly to destroy it; to ruin all its establishments 
and all our chief seaports ; to harass the whole of our sea 
coast, unless some parts be designedly favoured, to create a 
division of interests between our northern, southern, and 
western states ; to occupy some military posts on those cen- 
tral points, which would be of a great deal more value to 
her than the whole barren and expensive province of Canada, 
and that to accomplish this she will spare neither ships. 



Chap. hi. 4tt 

money, troops, arms and intrigues, bribes, promises and con- 
spiracies, nor any means whatsoever ; that her expeditions 
will be more formidable by their numbers and quality, better 
combined and directed than in the last war; that her troops 
and especially her artillery and engineers, will be found 
greatly improved, and that she is better acquainted with the 
resources and localities of America, and no longer entertains 
such an overweening opinion of her own superiority, nor such 
a contempt for the means of her enemy. Whether, with the 
prospect of such an attack before us, our present confidence 
and security be well founded ; whether our present means of 
defence be sufficient to withstand it, or whether prudence 
does not imperiously call upon us to organize them on a more 
effective footing, shall be the subject of another chapter. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Investigation of the chief objections which are made to the 
augmentation and improvement of our Military Establish- 
ments. Insufficiency of the Navy and Militia alone for the 
purposes of national defence. 

From this brief analysis of the changes which the govern- 
ment of Great Britain, and the character of her civil and 
military institutions, have undergone, in the course of her 
late contests with France ; from the improvement of her 
forces, and the nature of her grasping and envious policy, of 
that policy which can only support her present overgrown 
and artificial power, by the depression and debasement of 
every rising nation ; from the review of her conduct in the 
last war, which shows that what she has done must not be 
taken as a sample of all that she can and will do ; from the 
abstract of the possible and probable measures which she 
may take to humble and even destroy the strength of Ameri- 
ca on the next occasion, we might trust that our people would 
be awake to the necessity of preparing and consolidating 
their means of defence in the present period of peace, and 
whilst England is yet involved in financial difficulties. As 
nevertheless there seems to prevail amongst a portion of the 
nation and some of our statesmen, apprehensions concerning 
the warlike spirit growing in America, fears that our miiitary 
force might be employed on some future day to subvert those 
liberties which they have so bravely defended, and conse- 
quently a desire of reducing it to the smallest and most in- 
significant scale, and a dislike to apply any considerable por- 
tion of the public revenue to military works and prepara- 
tions ; as those feelings natural in a free country are plausi- 
bly grounded on the experience of past ages, and established 

7 



Chap. rv. 50 

political axioms, it will be proper to examine and discuss them 
before we proceed any farther. 

The chief arguments used on the occasion, and I do not 
desire to weaken them in the exposition, are these : Where- 
ever a free people, either with a view to aggrandizement and 
conquest, or even for the purpose of self-defence, have given 
too much strength to their executive and their military force, 
their liberties have been uniformly subverted. Such was the 
fate of the Greek republics in antiquity, and of the Italian 
commonwealths in the middle ages, such was formerly the fate 
of Rome, and such of France and of England in modern 
days. Standing armies are heterogeneous elements in the 
constitution of a free government, exclusively confined to the 
profession of arms, isolated from the people, and subject to 
a discipline, of which absolute authority in the chiefs and 
passive obedience in the subalterns are the fundamental prin- 
ciples. The natural independence of soldiers must be blunt- 
ed by these habits, and they must necessarily contract a cer- 
tain disregard for civil virtues and those civil laws and au- 
thorities with which they have so little connexion. To these 
cogent reasons others are added, equally forcible, and drawn 
from the peculiar constitution of America. Formed by a 
confederation of independent republics, the central govern- 
ment is to each of them an object of jealousy, and they vigi- 
lantly watch its measures and resist any enlargement of its 
powers. This is the great palladium of our liberties, and 
that vigilance should never be intermitted. Our constitu- 
tion, our representation, are so essentially democratic, that 
no course of measures can be pursued for any time, or to 
any extent by the government, without the consent and ap- 
probation of a majority of the people. They are daily in- 
vestigated, and by the frequency of our elections are in fact 
directed, as they should be, by the public will. Economy 
should therefore be the first principle of a government, where 
the people really tax themselves, and are not taxed by a de- 
lusive representation as in England ; nor will they impose on 



51 Chap. iv. 

themselves any burden, unless it be demonstrated to them 
that it h indispensable for their safety or benefit. Despotic 
governments alone can form great and magnificent establish- 
ments, and these in their turn support and strengthen despo- 
tism. A standing army may be necessary to such govern- 
ments for the purposes of invasion and foreign conquest, but 
these have always been ruinous to a republic, and our con- 
stitution only allows of a defensive system, for which a naval 
force, which is never dangerous to liberty, and our militia, the 
people themselves, defending their own homes and properties, 
and their own rights, are amply sufficient. We should stand 
ourselves the bulwark of our country, we should fight our 
own battles, and never surrender our arms into the hands of 
any subsidized force whatsoever ; wherever the people did 
so they were enslaved, and they deserved to be enslaved. 

In reply to these objections, I shall begin by observing that 
the example of other nations is not applicable to us ; our 
constitution, the nature of our territory and of our people, 
have no parallel in history. That people are universally en- 
lightened, universally republican, and universally armed ; 
twenty state governments, each possessed of independent 
forces, watch the general government, and the members of 
the legislature are more anxious for popularity in their respec- 
tive states, than for credit with an administration which has 
few incentives to offer to private ambition. Neither do we 
require a large force ; we can never be assailed by overwhelm- 
ing numbers, from our distant and isolated situation, and from 
the immense expense of transmarine expeditions ; it is the 
quality, and not the quantity of our enemies' troops which 
can render them dangerous. The immense extent of our 
coasts precludes the possibility of their being defended en- 
tirely by the regular army; and all those nations who were 
subdued by their own soldiers, had first given up the use of 
arms. But from the very nature of things, our defence must 
ultimately depend upon our militia. Far be it from us, to 
propose disarming the nation; still farther, to render America 



Chap. iY. 52 

• 
a military power ; we deprecate the spirit of conquest, we 
deprecate the creation of a great military establishment* 
possessing a separate interest and influence in the country, 
isolated from its political principles, solely subservient to any 
executive whatsoever, and strong enough to be turned against 
the people. A defensive system is the only one which our 
constitution allows ; but it should be sufficient, effective, and 
well organized. The only point, therefore, which we have to 
examine is, whether the navy and militia are sufficient for that 
purpose, and no argument can be drawn from the dangers 
which our liberties may run from a standing army, if our 
defence requires one ; for supposing even that it could never 
be formed on republican principles, nor animated by patriotic 
feelings, which we hope and believe is far from being the case, 
it would be but a poor compliment to the spirit of America, 
to assert that the liberties of a million of armed citizens 
would run any danger from a few thousand regulars. 

It would be superfluous to go over those arguments, which 
were advanced by Hamilton, by Madison, by all the sages of 
the revolution, at the glorious period when the American con- 
stitution was discussed, and finally adopted, by the most con- 
summate wisdom that ever ruled the affairs of men ; those 
arguments, confirmed by so many years of unparalleled pros- 
perity, demonstrate that, under our institutions, the liberty of 
America can run no risk from the power of its elective central 
government. But if the object of that government be to give 
strength and dignity to the nation abroad, and union at home, 
it must be liberally provided with all the necessary means. 
Let these be inspected as jealously, as closely, as the nature 
of our democratic constitution requires ; but they should 
exist, it is the interest of every state and individual that they 
should. Our liberties, I fear, run more danger from the weak- 
ness than from the strength of the federal government ; if it 
cannot afford prompt and efficient protection to every part of 
the union in time of war, if one will, one administration, one 



i*3 Chap. jv. 

uniform organization docs not pervade the whole of our de- 
fensive system ; if the several great divisions of our country 
separate their interests, and rely only on their individual 
means for their protection, not only those means will prove 
insufficient, and their defence unconnected and unsystemati- 
cal, against an enemy attacking them with all the contrary 
advantages ; but they will afford to that enemy an occasion of 
bringing about, by his intrigues, his grand object, the division 
of America. The connecting link, the central government, 
cannot be too much strengthened ; if once it is broken, all 
the evils deprecated by our jealousy will be felt with tenfold 
intensity. Our independent governments, suspicious of each 
other, will vie in every military establishment, and in strength- 
ening their executives, until they will all be turned into 
military despotisms. The hopes of mankind, that a new era 
of liberal and enlightened freedom was going to commence, 
these hopes would be crushed, the rising splendour of the 
genius of American liberty, which dawned on a hailing and 
admiring world, with such pure and bright glory, accompanied 
by the prayers and wishes of all good men, would set in 
darkness and in disappointment ; the same disgusting, bloody, 
and uniform track in which the old world has marched, from 
mutual jealousies, wars, and usurpations, to despotism and 
revolution, would again be traced by the new, and the same 
dark and ensanguined hue would stain the white and unsullied 
pureness of her robe of freedom. 

^Economy should undoubtedly be one of the first principles 
of every republican administration, but economy does not con- 
sist in avoiding every expense till necessity imperiously calls 
for it ; in such cases, parsimony at one time is always followed 
by extravagant profusion at another. If we do not prepare 
our defensive means with leisure, order and deliberation in 
time of peace, we must create them with sudden haste and 
confusion, and at immense expense, at the moment of war. 
when they should already be in active motion. Moreover, 
they will necessarily be insufficient and badly organized. The 



Chap. iv. 34 

experience of the last war should at least have taught us so 
much. If economy was the paramount, the only object ol 
government, that same experience should have taught us, 
that from various reasons, which shall be further developed, 
no service is more expensive as well as inefficient than that 
of the militia. ^However startling the expense of great mili- 
tary establishments, such as those of France or England, Rus- 
sia or Austria, a little insight into the details of their adminis- 
tration will prove, that the force of a great nation cannot 
possibly be organized or exerted in a cheaper manner.; 
Economy is with great military powers the first principle, for 
every economy enables them to augment their force, (put we 
should be swayed by higher considerations'* (5) vide note 5. 

Those who are most unwilling to apply any portion of the 
public revenue to the army, are generally liberal to the navy. 
And it is a very popular opinion, that by strengthening it suffi- 
ciently, we might dispense with other forces. It would be 
the height of presumption in an officer, who has seen no sea 
service, to venture a positive opinion on this subject, and we 
all know that America contains all the elements of a naval es- 
tablishment, and those of the most perfect kind ; her coasts 
are admirably adapted for creating a naval power; her im- 
mense commerce is an inexhaustible nursery of sailors, and 
her seamen are perhaps the hardiest, the most skilful and in- 
trepid in the world. But popular as our navy universally and 
justly is, covered with glory as it was in the last war, it is yet 
in its infancy. (6) vide note 6. I would refer its greatest 
admirers to Rogers, to Porter and Decatur, to be informed 
whether it can cope with all the forces which Britain can 
send against us ; whether it can repel every attack directed 
on our extensive coasts ; how long it must be, and what im- 
mense expense must be incurred, before its establishments 
can rival those of Britain, Woolwich, Deptford, Chatham, 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. • I believe that our few ships will 
always beat an equal British force. But who can doubt, 
that if England was at peace with the rest of the world, she 



55 Chap. iv. 

might pour from these great establishments, such an over- 
whelming power as would effectually destroy, or at least block- 
ade our navy ; and on the first occasion, she will certainly 
strain every nerve to ruin and eradicate every trace of our 
arsenals, navy yards, and all marine establishments. Instead 
of protecting the nation, they will for a long time require to 
be protected ; besides, it should be observed, that by the pos- 
session of Canada, and still more, if she takes possession of 
Cuba, England should not only be considered as a distant 
naval power, but as a neighbouring enemy ; her means of ag- 
gression are organized, not only in England, but in the neigh- 
bourhood of America. 

From all these reasons, the objections to the military esta- 
blishment of the United States are reducible to this single ques- 
tion : is the militia sufficient for their defence ? That defence, 
for the reasons which we have mentioned above, must ulti- 
mately and chiefly devolve upon it, but can it stand alone the 
fatigues of a long and protracted campaign ; can it stand the 
attack of an experienced and disciplined enemy, directed by 
chiefs who have made the art of war their sole and particular 
study, without being supported by a force of similar nature, 
and led by chiefs of the same character. How often, during 
the revolutionary war and during the last war, has experience 
taught us that they cannot. I might content myself with quo- 
ting the repeated testimony of Washington to that purpose ; 
but the subject deserves to be fully investigated. 

1 would render full justice to the American militia. In the 
defence of their country, of their homes and of their liberty, 
they have done wonders, and displayed the greatest patriotism, 
self devotion and intrepidity. Sober, vigilant, active and brave, 
nature has admirably qualified them to become good soldiers; 
they bear, without repining, hunger and thirst, heat, cold and 
fatigues of all kinds ; they are generally good marksmen, and 
as light troops incomparable ; when covered by walls or lines, 
when fighting in woods or marshes, they will stand against ve- 



Chap. iv. 56 

teran troops, and when supported by regulars, have sometimes 
eminently contributed to success in the field. 

But, although they will hold a line as long as they only have 
to fire before them, they cannot stand if they are turned, nor 
rally if they are broken on any point, nor be led to successive 
assaults, nor return to the charge if they lose their position. 
It cannot be expected that they should stand alone a re- 
gular and scientific attack, nor a prolonged campaign ; and 
besides the consciousness of inexperience, both in the chiefs 
and men, the little confidence which they can have in each 
other, the novelty and terror of the scenes of danger into 
which they are brought, their anxieties about those homes, 
those families, those professions from which they have sudden- 
ly been torn, defects common to all militias, the Americans, 
from the very nature of their government, have some defects 
in their militia system peculiar to themselves. 

1st. In the first place, their organization in brigades, bat- 
talions, and their armament and equipment, (whatever the con- 
stitution may require) their service, discipline and instruction, 
such as they are, vary in every state, and are more or less 
strict or uniform, according to the care which the several 
state governments, who jealously reserve to themselves the 
direction and superintendence of their militia, choose to give 
to these objects. When brought together, this produces all 
the inconvenience which is found in a confederated army 
of different independent nations : armies which are always bad 
and insufficient, even when the troops which compose them 
are separately well organized and instructed, which is far 
from being our case. 

2d. In the next place, the mode of appointing the militia 
efficers varies also in different states, but is no where calcu- 
lated to put in these important and confidential stations the 
most proper persons. In some the council of appointment, 
in most the men themselves select them. In some the staff 
officers are named by the state governments ; in some by the 



01 Chap. iv. 

choice of the subaltern officers. Supposing that party spirit 
and private influence had no share in these appointments, 
how are the qualities, instruction and fitness of the officers to 
be appreciated by such methods. It is evident that generally 
their epaulets alone must distinguish them from the men 
whom they command. A few brilliant exceptions, such as 
Brown and Jackson, Harrison, Ripley, Johnson, &c. do not 
militate against this general rule. 

3d. Thirdly. The manner in which their services are com- 
bined with those of the regular army and of each other, pro- 
duces serious inconveniences. The law merely provides, that 
amongst the militia of several states, officers of equal rank 
take command according to their seniority, and that the 
officers of the line only take precedence of those of the same 
rank in the militia. The governor of the state where the army 
serves has the right of assuming its chief command, whatever 
be his military capacity and instruction. In consequence, a 
militia officer, perhaps chosen for his electioneering influence, 
and exclusively applied in the previous course of his life to 
other cares and to other studies, may happen to command and 
direct the operations of an experienced soldier, who has made 
the art of war the study of his life. In every other profes- 
sion, some previous information is deemed necessary. No 
one would confide his health to a physician, his fortune to a 
merchant, his affairs to a lawyer, without full confidence in his 
learning or experience. But we confide the defence of our 
•try and liberties indiscriminately to every popular fa 
voii'ite. The jealousies and dislikes, which must break oiitr 
b . <:en the militias of several states; the difficulty of subject- 
ing <hem to the command of a chief who may be of a weaker 
state, must slnke, at the first view, any person acquainted 
with the nature of these troops in all ages and countries. 

4th. Fourthly. From the nature of our federal constitu- 
tion, it is impossible to count on their services, when their 
state governments do not choose to co-operate heartily and 



Chap. iv. 5U 

actively in the general cause. At any rate, those governments 
claim the right of raising and organizing as they please the 
forces which the federal government require to be put at 
their disposal. In the last war, the New-England states 
positively refused to aid the government, and in Massachu- 
setts, the supreme court, authorizing that selfishand unpatriotic 
conduct, expounded according to the popular feelings in that 
state, the article of the constitution which specifies the cases 
where the president may call upon the service of the militia. 
In the review of that war, we have developed the misfor- 
tunes which resulted from these measures, and the state of 
weakness and imbecility to which they reduced the Ameri- 
cans. The prudence and moderation of the general govern- 
ment, which passed over their conduct, and avoided a discus- 
sion which might have brought on a civil war, probably pre- 
vented greater evils, perhaps a separation of the states. But 
those recent facts imperiously prove how little the militia 
alone can be relied on. 

5th. Fifthly. From the little instruction, authority and 
credit of their officers, from the very spirit of -independence 
of the people, who deem an exact discipline incompatible 
with personal liberty, it is impossible to reduce them under 
proper subordination. And yet the Romans, the freest and 
proudest of nations at home, were sufficiently submissive 
and obedient in the camp. They understood that military 
subordination is never degrading, because its object is noble. 
Amongst us, slight fines are the only means of compelling 
the service of the militia, and even these excite every day 
the most scandalous and expensive lawsuits and public dis- 
cussions, as shameful to the national character, as they are 
intolerable in the daily course of service. 

6th. Sixthly. The service of the militia is not only in- 
sufficient, but most extravagantly expensive. Not only, as I 
iiave formerly mentioned is it ruinous to those individuals 
whom it withdraws from their ordinary avocations, and whose 



J9 Chap. iv. 

losses should be included in the estimation of its expense, 
but its temporary administration, organized in the sudden 
moment of necessity by men of no experience, is always dis- 
orderly and profuse. From the variability of its force, from 
the rotation of its service, it is impossible to ascertain exactly 
its numbers and consequently clear its accounts, even where 
there is no malversation. It is very difficult to settle which 
charges belong to the states and which to the central govern- 
ment, and between them, all the wants of the militia, their 
armament, clothing, equipment and approvisionment of all 
kinds, the hospital expenses and those of the medical depart- 
ment and artillery, &c. are always miserably provided, con- 
fusedly administered, never accounted for, and yet paid by 
the nation at the most extravagant rate. Are these accounts 
all settled since the last war ? Are they ever likely to be 
settled? 

From all these reasons, the militia is not calculated to re- 
sist alone a strong invasion, nor stand a long campaign. They 
are brave; they may be exalted by enthusiasm in a day of 
battle ; and, as light troops, we have already observed, that 
they are incomparable. But we cannot count upon them 
for the sole defence of the country. If such was our pur- 
pose, it would be necessary, by a uniform and general law, 
to divide it in classes ; to withdraw entirely, from the super- 
intendence of its respective states, a given portion of the 
youngest and most active classes, and to commit the power 
of requiring and compelling their service, by rotation, during 
a portion of every year, the power of appointing their offi- 
cers, and the whole of their organization, administration, 
discipline and instruction, to the uniform, steady and simple 
direction of the central government. A military system 
founded on this principle, might be rendered most perfect 
and proper for a republic. But it would be needless to 
dwell on measures which will not be adopted. The state 
governments will never commit their militias to the federal 
executive. For that very reason, if they do not wish the 



Chap. it. 60 

country to remain in a defenceless state, they must maintain 
a regular army at its disposal, calculated to support the mi- 
litia, and encounter the efforts of a disciplined enemy. 

Even then, some of the abuses and defects existing in the 
militia system would require to be redressed; and the state 
governments can do much for that purpose. It were highly 
desirable, that the organization, instruction and discipline, 
armament and equipment of the militia, were uniform ; that 
their service and administration, when acting conjointly 
with the regular army, were better fixed, and that more care 
were taken in the selection of their officers ; some previous 
instruction required by the state governments in the candi- 
dates for these offices, and a preference given in their ap- 
pointment to such citizens as had served in the army, in some 
former war, or in the military schools. 

A last and a serious objection has been lately raised against 
maintaining a regular army in America. It is a delicate and 
V painful subject, and one which I do not willingly enter in. 
Some disagreeable differences have arisen between one of 
our most justly celebrated chiefs and some of our represen- 
tatives and civil authorities. On these it would not become 
me to give an opinion. But it has been pretended, in conse- 
quence, that the spirit of our army is already mutinous and 
arrogant, and that it behoves us to get rid of it in time, and 
before it grows dangerous. 

I trust that the sensitiveness of private feelings, and per- 
haps the exaggerations of that party spirit, and of that jea- 
lousy of the government, which sometimes thwarts amongst 
us the most useful measures, and throws a cast of disinge- 
nuous illiberality on our public discussions, unworthy of a 
free and great people ; I trust that such are the only founda- 
tions of this accusation. But supposing, for the sake of argu- 
ment, that it were founded; we should first ascertain whether 
We can dispense with the services of the army, and if we find 



61 Chap. rv. 

that we cannot, we should correct whatever abuses may 
exl-t in it laws, establishments and military spirit. Patience, 
discipi-ae. obedience, and a proper subordination to the go- 
vernment, and to his chiefs, in all that concerns his military 
service, to the civil authorities on every other occasion; 
such should be the first and most indispensable qualities of 
every soldier. The functions of the army, in the great po- 
litical machine, should operate as silently, as smoothly and 
regularly, as those of its other wheels. If that part of the 
machine jars and creaks, and impedes the march of the rest, 
repair it, replace it in its right order ; but if you take it out, 
and cast it away, beware how the machine will go on with- 
out it. 

If the navy and militia are not alone sufficient to protect 
us, it becomes of the utmost importance to examine the 
principles on which our defensive force should be formed, 
and the elements of which it should consist. These objects 
we shall endeavour to investigate and discuss in the next 
chapter. 



CHAPTER V. 

Necessity of organizing both the materiel and personnel of our 
defensive means on a permanent footing, in time of peace, 
and under the sole control of the national federal executive. 

The permanent force which is necessary to protect every 
nation in time of war, and even to secure its respectability 
and independence in time of peace, divides itself under two 
heads, v/hich the French writers term the personnel and the 
materiel ; and which a lawyer amongst us would call the force 
of persons and the force of things. The first consists of the 
troops, the second of the arms, ordnance, and ammunition, 
subsistence, clothing, lodging and necessaries of all kinds, of 
the administration of all these means, of the fortifications, 
roads, bridges, canals, instruments, &c. which are required to 
render the service of these troops effective. However opi- 
nions may differ about the necessity of organizing the personnel 
in time of peace, it is evident that the materiel must be orga- 
nized with leisure and tranquillity. The hasty works which 
are thrown up in the moment of danger, are generally badly 
planned, insufficient for their purpose, and erected in the most 
slovenly and expensive manner. The same may be said of all 
sudden preparations of war, the armament, the subsistence, 
medical means in such cases, &c. are almost always incom- 
plete, extravagantly expensive, and administered with confu- 
sion. The first care of the government should therefore be 
to erect those permanent fortifications which are necessary 
for the defence of the country. 

It may appear a gigantic enterprise, and beyond our means, 
to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of America. 



63 Chap. v. 

But it is not the number of fortified posts which constitutes the 
strength of a frontier; it is their proper disposition. It is well 
known that the Roman empire was never so weak as when 
every village was converted into a citadel. The expenses 
which government applies to such purposes, should be calcula- 
ted upon the relative importance of the points which it has 
to defend, and that can only be ascertained by exact and sci- 
entific surveys. Such as cover a vast and rich extent of open 
territory; such as secure the great communications of a coun- 
try by land or water; such as contain an immense proportion 
of private property, or such as are destined by their position 
and natural advantages to become the seat of great naval or 
military establishments, require to be defended, and against 
such alone, will great expeditions and great efforts be direct 
ed. An invader would soon fruitlessly ruin himself by a con- 
trary course. Less important points will therefore seldom be 
attacked but by small predatory parties, and must be left to 
their own local means of defence, if the enemy should waste 
great expense and powerful means in attacking them, ail can- 
not be guarded, and some must be sacrificed to cover others 
of more importance. The destruction of New- York, for ex- 
ample, would be a greater disaster, even to the people of th< 
Niagara frontier, than that of Buffalo. 

In tracing the probable views of the enemy in the next war. 
we have designated the chief points which require to be for 
tified. Our naval establishments, on which the future great- 
ness of America chiefly depends, are the most important; no 
expense can be considered too lavish for the purpose of orga- 
nizing and strengthening them on a scale worthy of their fu- 
ture destinies, and enabling them to defy every attack, ll 
these stations are not occupied by us, they will be occupied 
by the British, and become more mischievous in their hands. 
as centres of annoyance, than useful in ours, as centres of de- 
fence. The same observation applies to New-Orleans ; but 
the labours pursued at this moment by the American engi- 
neers, will soon give us more exact notions on this subject. 



Ch^p. t. 64 

The reconnaissance which they are making is one of the wisest 
measures of the American government. No permanent de- 
fensive works, requiring so much time and expense before 
they can be finished, should be undertaken till such a recon- 
naissance of the whole frontier, under all its military proper- 
ties, has ascertained their use and necessity, and combined 
their relations with each other on a grand and uniform system, 
(7) vide note 7; otherwise chance alone and a very unlikely 
and uncommon chance, must guide us in selecting proper 
positions. Such works should not be erected for small and 
local interests, but all with a view to the part which they must 
act, in the general system of the national defence. 

When all the chief points in the country shall be sufficiently 
secured by permanent defensive works, the enemy will use- 
lessly exhaust his resources in attacking them by grand expe- 
ditions, such as we have mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
He will be reduced to predatory excursions along our coasts. 
But the erection of such works alone is not sufficient ; they 
must be armed, manned, and communicate together. 

The second care of the government should therefore be to 
open easy, ready, and cheap communications, by land and wa- 
ter, between all these defensive posts, and to extend their 
ramifications through the whole country, to connect the gene- 
ral defensive system, and thus be enabled to carry their forces 
rapidly on every menaced point. A scientific and military 
topographical survey of the whole country, of its levels and 
soils, even of its geology, and of all its military qualities, is 
therefore indispensable, before the grand system of the national 
communications, canals, roads and bridges, &c. can be or- 
ganized on a proper plan ; such only as are necessary open, 
and no useless expense lavished on points of no importance. 
I need not expatiate on the utility of such works for a thou- 
sand purposes, almost as important as our military defence. 

But to utilize these surveys, it is necessary that the an- 



65 Chap. v. 

nual result of the labours of our engineers, the collection of all 
their views, projects, memoirs and calculation^ their topo- 
graphical, military and statistical works of all kinds, plans, 
views, charts and maps, descriptive of the whole of our coun- 
try, under all its properties, and of all possible improvements 
to be made in it, should be deposited in the war office, classed 
and registered, and religiously preserved for the government 
to consult on every occasion. This collection should form 
the archives of the forces and means of trie nation, the memoir 
of its defence : no part of it should be published nor allowed 
to circulate but by the express desire of the legislature or exe- 
cutive, and if copies be sent by order of the government to 
direct public works, commanding officers, &c. the originals 
••should always remain at the disposal of the secretary of war. 
Such an establishment is productive of incalculable economy 
and benefit ; it is considered indispensable in every well orga- 
nized government. (8) vide note 8. 

The next care of the government should be to secure the ar- 
mament of the nation. Those who are not aware of the mag- 
nitude and importance of England's military establishments, 
may see, in the memoir of Chevalier Dupin, the immense 
means of hostility and destruction which she has collected, the 
care with which she improves them, the perfect order in which 
they are classed, preserved, and organized, and the readiness 
with which they can be put in activity. That similar, if not 
equal establishments, should be organized in this country, ad- 
ministered with order and economy, but without parsimony, 
and directed by men of consummate skill and knowledge, is 
most necessary. Our foundries, arsenals, military establish- 
ments of all kinds, destined to provide the navy and army with 
the means of the national defence, should be formed on a scale 
of magnitude, corresponding to the power of the enemy and to 
the importance of the objects which they are destined to de- 
fend. 

A great part of our armament is provided amongst us h\ 

9 



Chap, r. 66 

the state governments and by the people themselves, for the 
first interest of a free people is to be universally armed. 
But every man conversant with military service, must con- 
ceive how necessary it is that the armament should be uni- 
form, and to what trouble, confusion, and serious inconve- 
nience we must be exposed by the multitude and diversity 
of calibers, when the different states and individuals are left 
to provide themselves with arms, according to their own fancy. 
If all military fabric's were put under the inspection and di- 
rection of the national government, this evil would be reme- 
died, and we do not conceive what possible alarm such a 
measure could inspire, or what additional power it would 
give to the government. At least, were it for this reason 
alone (and we shall give many others), it is indispensable 
that a central ordnance department and a corps of national 
artillery should exist, not only to provide for the national ser- 
vice, but to serve as a model to those of our twenty different 
states, to pursue those experiments and form those great de- 
pots, which require the means of a great nation, and to con- 
centrate the theoretical knowledge and modern and growing 
improvements of that service. (9) vide note 9. 

The approvisionment of an army in all the necessaries of 
life, subsistence and forage, clothing and covering, medi- 
cal means and hospitals, &c. which completes what we have 
termed the materiel of the national force, and is the proper 
subject of military administration, must be secured at the ap- 
proach of war; but during a time of peace may safely be 
proportioned to the small force which is then kept upon foot. 
Before the establishment of our commissariat, this part of the 
service appears to have been in a state of infancy amongst 
us. Those kinds of means are all provided amongst us by 
private contract, a very sufficient way, if properly directed 
and inspected. But our generals were then obliged to con- 
clude those bargains and contracts themselves, and had no 
prompt or sufficient means to compel their execution. 
Charged thereby with a multiplicity of cares which they 



67 Chap. v. 

could not attend to, their views were at every moment turned 
aside from those objects to which alone they should be direct- 
ed, and military operations frequently failed in consequence. 

If we turn from the materiel of war, to the personnel or 
troops, before we develope the manner in which they should 
be organized and employed in our national defence, we must 
again combat a common prejudice existing in this country. 
Granting, it is said, that a standing army is necessary in time 
of war, and not dangerous to our liberties, cannot we always 
organize one when it is wanted, and avoid burdening ourselves 
with such an expense in time of peace. 

But if an army is only organized in time of war, it will 
at first be no better than a militia. In the course of time 
it may acquire firmness and experience, generals and officers 
may be formed, its service and administration may be regula- 
ted; but, in the mean time, if the enemy acts with common 
foresight and vigour, that experience will be dearly bought by 
severe losses and humiliating defeats. The difficulty and the 
immense expense which will attend the forming and recruit- 
ing, training, officering and organizing at once a whole army, 
can easily be appreciated ; the confusion and prodigality of 
all sudden military preparations we have already dwelt upon. 
In fact, the enemy will meet with no resistance from such an 
army in the first campaign, and very little in the second, and 
what mischief may he not do during that time. This was the 
case even in the beginning of the last war, when the British 
were so ill prepared on their side. 

An army consists of officers and privates. The number of 
the privates may indeed be very much reduced in time of 
peace, for they can always be trained in the course of a few 
weeks when their services are required. But still a certain 
number must be maintained, to keep up the habits of discip- 
line, military spirit and practical service, and instil them 



Chap. v. ti<i 

afterwards in' the recruits. From some personal experience, 
I can aver that nothing is more inefficient than new corps ; 
it is this which makes the difference hetween them and vete- 
ran regiments. Besides, the non-commissioned officers on 
whom the discipline and daily duties so much depend, can 
only be formed in a long course of regular service. 

But the good qualities of all kinds of troops must always 
ultimately depend on those of the officers. From the pro- 
gressive and successive improvements of the art of war in all 
its branches, in the organization and administration of armies_, 
in their discipline, in their movements and tactics, in the va- 
rious and more scientific department of the staff officer, 
artillerist and engineer, that art has become an abstruse 
science, and requires that a certain class of men should de- 
vote to it the whole of their thoughts, studies and time. And 
if these men serve with the prospect of being disbanded on 
the return of peace, can it be expected that with so short and 
precarious a career before them, and so small a stimulus to 
their ambition and love of glory, they will apply themselves 
with enthusiasm to a study in itself dry and unattractive, 
and to all the petty cares and details which must employ 
every moment of a good officer's life. Neither do those 
brave men who defend their country in the hour of danger, 
deserve, when danger is past, to be cast off to want and po- 
verty, viewed with jealousy and distrust, be arraigned per- 
haps for their very services, and have the smallest pittance 
dealt to them with unwilling parsimony, after a great loss of 
time and labour, and when they are incapacitated for every 
other profession. Such conduct is impolitic as well as unge- 
nerous and unjust. Unless the profession of an officer be 
rendered as permanent and secure as it is honourable, unless 
he is thereby inspired with a proper love for his service, and 
for that purpose maintained in time of peace, exclusively ap- 
plied to th^ study and practice of his military duties, these 
places in time of war will never be filled but by idle loungers 



09 Chap. v. 

and dissipated coxcombs, smitten with the flash of a uniform 
and brilliancy of a parade. 

Even in the subaltern station of an officer of infantry, how 
various and how important are his functions? They must 
engross not only the whole of his time, but the whole of his 
thoughts, hopes, ideas, and prospects. And is it to be ex- 
pected that with no more information than what he may have 
acquired on a militia parade, any citizen, drawn from his 
ordinary avocations, to undertake the command of a company, 
will be acquainted with these duties, and practise them by in- 
tuition. Suppose he devolves them upon his sergeant, the 
sergeant must possess the requisite qualities. Such was the 
case in France before the revolution ; all military offices 
belonged by hereditary and prescriptive right to the nobility; 
and those luxurious and effeminate minions, whose only merit 
was personal bravery, devolved on their plebeian subalterns 
the whole of their duties; but when the revolution broke out, 
Hoche, Soult, Pichegru, Massena, and a crowd of heroes and 
warriors, burst forth from that class, where a great deal of 
military information had gradually spread and concentred 
itself. 

The duties of an officer of infantry are not confined to the 
exercises and manoeuvres of his troop ; these are intelligible 
to the most vulgar capacity, easily learned, and easily directed. 
But his cares must be extended to every thing that concerns 
its welfare ; he must be the father of his company; the clean- 
liness, temperance, molality, and health of his men are under 
his daily inspection ; their service, order and discipline he 
should constantly superintend ; their instruction direct, nor 
disdain to enter into all their little interests, and all the details 
of their clothing, feeding, lodging, armament and equipment, 
&c. If the captain and officers of every company do not 
keep a constant and watchful eye over these details, the waste 
and profusion of the regimental administration can never be 



Chap. v. 70 

remedied by the exactness or vigilance of any superior au- 
thority. A good captain should form the spirit of his men, 
and by attending with zeal and inclination to their interests, 
he will secure, sooner than by any improper weakness or 
indulgence, that affection and respect, which a soldier should 
feel for his chief, in every well regulated army. 

These cares, with the study of his particular service in 
every situation, and a general acquaintance with the whole 
theory of the art of war, should be common to every officer. 
But in the artillery, the previous information required is still 
more extensive, the details of service are more numerous, and 
the objects of inspection more important. If indeed the 
duty of the artillery officer be confined to the direction of a 
fixed battery, or command of a company, he may learn it by 
rote, and that may suffice for the service of the militia, and 
the defence of fixed positions on the coast. But if he wishes 
to understand his profession theoretically, he must acquire 
much previous mathematical learning, and receive a scientific 
education. Nor is there any part of the sublimer theory of 
tactics to which he should be a stranger; the principles of 
fortification he should understand, either to attack or defend 
them with success, and the tactics of the field, to co-operate 
in them with effect. As the ordnance department is a branch 
of the artillery, the fabrication and inspection of all kinds of 
arms, makes a part of his attributions, and he must be versed 
in all the process of their manufacture. ( 1 0) vide note 1 0. It is 
absurd to think of creating such a corps at the moment of war ; 
it has required centuries to carry it to'perfection in Europe. 

The profession of the engineer requires still more learning 
and study, as much indeed as those which are called the learn- 
ed professions, the lawyer's, physician's, or divine's. There 
is scarcely a branch of natural philosophy which should 
be totally foreign to his studies ; the laws of mechanics, the 
force of chemical compounds, the specific weight and gravity 



71 Chap. v. 

of every substance which he may employ, should be familiar 
to him. He should be acquainted with the whole theory of 
tactics, to judge, at one glance, of the military properties of a 
country ; he should be fertile in resources and inventions, 
ready at drawing a survey, and levying a map, prompt in 
calculating, and accurate in balancing the means and object, 
expense, time, and materials requisite even for a sudden work. 
His profession, in short, is one of the most profound and 
practically useful of the branches of human learning; his 
talents may be pre-eminently serviceable in time of peace, 
applied to those internal improvements by which commerce, 
agriculture and manufactures are equally benefited, and in 
time of war his services are indispensable. Exact surveys, 
by pointing out the proper-places, and proper means of de- 
fence, save at such moments an incalculable expense to the 
nation, which would have been thrown away on useless and 
ill-designed works. England, with laudable spirit, is endea- 
vouring at present to form a good corps of engineers ; but in 
America, the fruits of such an establishment would be incom- 
parably greater ; for in no country can works be erected of 
such magnitude, of such benefit to posterity, and to the world; 
works to immortalize the name, and excite the disinterested 
ambition of any engineer. The genius of that useful corps 
should not be cramped by an illiberal and short-sighted par- 
simony, their feelings disgusted from the service, and their 
conceptions rendered useless. Our engineers should be 
numerous and instructed, organized on the most efficient 
footing, and maintained on the most liberal system; for every 
good engineer who retires, is a real loss to the country. 
(11) vide note 1 1. 

The staff and administration equally require to be directed 
by experienced officers. An intimate acquaintance with the 
various and infinite details of military service, and habits of 
order, economy, exactness, and despatch of business, are es- 
sentail in these departments. The most serious evils result- 



Chap. v. 72 

ed in the last war from the want of a good commissariat. 
General officers, it may be said, have sometimes distinguished 
themselves without any previous military information. It is 
true, that some sublimer geniuses, soaring at once to the 
higher excellences of the art, have formed rare and brilliant 
exceptions to the general rule. But that genius, that intui- 
tive instinct of tactics, that eagle glance on the field of bat- 
tle, which makes a great general, which Moreau and Jackson 
displayed on leaving the bar, and Cromwell and Conde in 
their first battles, that genius would not suffice to make a good 
staff officer, nor even a tolerable adjutant. These should be 
acquainted with the various service of all kinds of troops in 
every situation, and with their general discipline and admini- 
stration ; they should have the habit of analyzing, classifying 
and abridging the multitude of reports which they receive, 
and drawing clear abstracts of them, Sic. It would be absurd 
to imagine that the generals who command, direct and super- 
intend the whole of the service, the staff officers who assist 
in them those duties, and draw the regular and pertinent re- 
ports of that service, require less study and information than 
those who are to execute their orders. 

Let us not then be reminded of a Curius, a Regulus, a 
Cincinnatus, and of all those worthy Romans who repeatedly 
left the plough to assume the command of the legions. In 
the first place the art of war was then in its infancy. How 
long would the legions of Rome have stood the attack of a 
modern army with its artillery? The science of the engi- 
neer was out of the question, and the operations of those small 
corps of heavy infantry, with very little cavalry and very few 
missile weapons, were confined to the neighbourhood of their 
city, and not calculated upon the surveyed topography of the 
country. In the next place, the Romans, those illustrious 
robbers, were a nation of thieves and soldiers; they subsist- 
ed by war and plunder, and those very chiefs, far from being 
raw recruits, had served from their earliest youth, and had 



73 Chap. v. 

successively passed through every rank of the militia, before 
Ihey attained to the command of armies. 

This chapter has been devoted to proving the necessity of 
organizing the two great branches of our defence, both the 
personnel and materiel, on a permanent and sufficient footing. 
In the next, we shall endeavour to point out the best manner 
of forming and organizing those means, employing them in 
time of war against such an attack as I have described, and 
even utilizing the services of the army in time of peace. 



10 



CHAPTER VI. 



A brief Abstract of the simplest, safest, and most effectual mode 
by which the national forces might be raised, instructed, or- 
ganized and employed in time of peace and in time of 7oar ; 
of their destination and numbers. 

If we have succeeded in proving the necessity of main- 
taining a standing army, the next point to consider is the best 
mode of forming and organizing it. Besides the general, ad- 
ministrative, medical staff, and engineers, an army is compo- 
sed of corps of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Cavalry we 
have little need for; the enemy cannot send against us any 
considerable force of that description by sea, and our northern 
frontiers are unfavourable to its movements. Mounted rifle- 
men will suffice for every purpose, and have been employed 
against the Indians, and even against the. British troops, at the 
Moravian towns, with great effect. But where cavalry is 
necessary, it becomes most important to maintain it on a re- 
spectable footing in time of peace, from the long training and 
instruction which men and horses require, and the difficulty 
of organizing it at the moment of war. 

Even in infantry and artillery, from the nature of our 
northern frontier, which is only assailable on some points, 
from the immensity of our western deserts, impervious to any 
civilized enemy, from the small numbers which can be di- 
rected from the distant regions of Europe against our eastern 
or southern shores,* we need fewer troops than any nation 
possessing a militar} r force. And our chief and ultimate de- 

* This argument loses much nf it* force if the British acquire Cuba. 



lb Ch.vp. vi. 

fence, as we have observed, rests and should rest upon our 
militia. 

But we have seen that the militia alone is not sufficient for 
that purpose. The army, therefore, if properly organized 
and on a system concordant with our republican institutions, 
should not be considered as the sole defensive force of the 
nation ; but as the firm basis on which that force is built, the 
steady centre round which it forms, the model on which it 
should be organized. The free and armed citizens of Ame- 
rica should all rise to defend their country in the hour of 
danger; but those who have made an exclusive and particu- 
lar study of the art of war, those who are paid and appointed 
by the people for that purpose, should stand in the front 
against the first attack, cover their fellow-citizens by their 
steadiness, guide them by their experience, and give them the 
example of obedience and of discipline. 

The soldiers in our army are raised by voluntary enlistment 
at high premiums. Besides being very expensive, this method 
is not calculated to procure a chosen quality of men. We 
certainly think that the annual service of the active class of 
the militia, in whatever small numbers, would be a more na- 
tional, a more republican mode of filling the ranks of th<>. 
army, and give it a higher and prouder character. But as 
such a measure would be unpopular, even on the smallest scale, 
and as we need but few troops, we may expect that from 
whatever class our soldiers are drawn, a severe discipline, 
but tending to exalt the pride of the soldiers, and not to break 
their spirit with harshness, flogging, and ill treatment, a pa- 
ternal and constant attention to their interests, a certain res- 
pectability given to the military character, a security against 
distress and beggary in their old age, and, above all, forming 
a good corps of officers, attached to their profession and 
proud of it, will suffice to make a good army, even out of 
bad elements. It is to be hoped that such a system will 
prevent those murmurs, discontents, and frequent desertions, 



Chap. vi. 76 

which a stranger finds with surprise in the troops of so great 
and noble a republic, in those very troops who have so glo- 
riously distinguished themselves and their country. 

On the officers must ultimately depend the character of all 
troops, and if we can secure a sufficient number of good offi- 
cers, soldiers will soon be formed. There are two modes of 
providing an army with experienced and instructed officers, 
either by drawing them from the sub-officers and cadets attach- 
ed to each company, or by rearing them in military schools. 
There is a third mode, indeed, which I had nearly forgotten, 
and which is much practised here as well as in England; that is, 
appointing to every rank, either by favour or interest, without 
regarding the previous qualities or information of the candi- 
date, and trusting to his disinterested zeal for acquiring the 
means of promotion, after he has obtained the end. 

As to the first of these modes, it can only be applicable to 
the service of the line, and even there, only in a country where 
the army is raised by the conscription, as in France, and com- 
prises in the ranks men of all descriptions and degrees of in- 
formation. A few promotions amongst the most able and 
clever sub-officers would tend however infinitely to exalt the 
pride and character of the soldier, and raise his profession in 
his own eyes. In France, most of our general and superior 
officers rose from that rank. 

But engineers and officers of artillery, who require a long 
and scientific education, can only be formed in military schools. 
And for several reasons, it were best that the mass of our offi- 
cers should also be drawn from those establishments, where 
they might be brought acquainted, more or less, with every 
branch of learning belonging to their profession, and with the 
general theory of the art of war; a knowledge which they can 
scarcely obtain in the seclusion and constant occupation of a 
regimental life. The field and staff officers, especially, who 
are generally drawn from the line, would not have to acquire 
that necessary information by slow and painful experience. 



77 Chap. vr. 

It is acknowledged that the present organization of our 
military schools, and the instruction given in them, are insuffi- 
cient. But after the excellent report of the secretary of war 
on this subject, little more need be said. If its views be 
adopted, these schools will be amply sufficient for every pur- 
pose. 

The greatest difficulty which will attend their organization 
on this vast and noble plan, will be the little encouragement 
which they will afford to young men desirous of pursuing the 
military line, from the small number of scholars who can b< 
provided for on the present scanty establishment of the na- 
tional forces. There is no doubt that our corps of engineers 
requires to be enlarged. They are overloaded with business. 
and what they can do, they must perform in a hasty, insuffi- 
cient and unsatisfactory manner. They have got no aids un- 
der them to inspect the conduct and detail of their works, as 
the French engineers had in the regiments of sappers and 
troops of the arme du genie. Ten times as many engineers 
could be most usefully and advantageously employed for civil 
as well as for military purposes, and no money could be laid 
out with greater profit; for the order, despatch and economy 
of their works would cover the expense tenfold. Nothing is 
more expensive than bad, and nothing more economical than 
good engineers. 

Most liberal encouragement should be given to all young 
men desirous of entering these schools, and on leaving them, 
they should be free, either to follow the line of public ser- 
vice, or apply their acquired information to their private 
advantage in the construction of public or private works, 
roads, bridges, canals, manufactures, Lc. The state govern- 
ments might greatly promote this object, by employing them 
in the direction of their public works. This they might do 
with great advantage and economy, and America has labours 
of that nature to perform for centuries, before she reaches the 
summit 0/ her grandeur. By these means avast fund of sci- 



Chap. -vi. 78 

entific mathematical learning will be disseminated through the 
country, and in time and case of need, every young man thus 
brought up, may serve as an engineer in the defence of his 
native state, and moreover, be sufficiently acquainted with 
general tactics to direct military movements. For the local 
defence of such parts of the' union as the general government 
cannot at all times provide for, this will be an inestimable 
advantage. 

In like manner, if the state governments would generally 
take care to appoint such young men to commands in their 
militia, especially in its staff service and artillery, that mea- 
sure alone would in a great degree remedy the defects of these 
troops, and render their service more efficacious. 

The result of all these observations and of this whole 
work is, that to have a good army on a system adapted to our 
government and circumstances, we should form and enter- 
tain a great number of good officers, and then we may 
safely reduce the number of our soldiers ; that to avoid the 
necessity of creating and instructing new corps, we should 
rather diminish the force than the number of our brigades 
and battalions, and organize them so as to incorporate 
readily in their ranks any reinforcements which circumstances 
may require, such as the probable means of the enemy, 
the nature of those means, and the mode of attack which he 
may adopt. Those brigades, supported and flanked by the 
militia, whose courage they would confirm by their own 
steadiness, would prove sufficient for our defence on every 
important point. The militia would serve as excellent light 
troops to guard them, and watch and harass the enemy. 
How far it might be proper to add to each brigade a small de- 
tachment of light dragoons and riflemen, and one or two 
field pieces, are military questions, which the experience of 
the brave officers, employed in the last war and acquainted 
with the topography of the country, can best resolve. 

Our present establishment is clearly insufficient for these 



79 Chap. vi. 

purposes, and if further reduced, will become absolutely 
useless. It comprises only nine full battalions and about 300 
officers of infantry. In time of war, we shall need a division 
of the army at New-Orleans, supported by the militia of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee. 
The militia, well organized, may perhaps suffice for the 
defence of Florida, Georgia and Carolina, but the Chesapeak 
will require a strong division of the army to cover our national 
establishments, the seat of government, and the rich shores of 
the bay. (Maryland should be attached to this division.) 
In our northern department, Ohio, Indiana and Michigan, (to 
which the Illinois and Missouri territories should be attached,) 
require a division of the army to garrison our Indian frontier 
to the Yellow Stone river, and in time of war, heading the 
militia of these states, pour upon Upper Canada. Anothei 
will be required on the Hudson, on the Delaware, in Nen- 
England, covering Boston and Rhode Island, and another on 
the northern frontier of New- York and Vermont. It is evi- 
dent that 40 battalions and 1000 officers will scarcely be 
sufficient for this service, even if the militia be so improved 
as to give some reliance on its service and co-opeiation. 
It is not necessary that we should therefore maintain that 
number, small as it is, in time of peace, but we should 
always have the means of completing it immediately on the 
approach of war. 

For that purpose we might maintain twenty battalions, re- 
duced to half the number of privates, a force little superior to 
what we maintain at present, but fully officered, and even attach 
to each of them a certain number of supernumerary officers. 
As soon as we determine on raising the army to the war 
establishment, these battalions should be completed, organi- 
zed in brigades and divisions, and encamped, whilst the super- 
numerary officers and sub-officers, detached with some chosen 
soldiers, receive and incorporate the recruits and organize 
twenty other battalions. If the military depots be amply 



Chap. vi. BO 

provided with arms, clothing, equipment, field equipages, &c. 
H is inconceivable in how short a time this may be done. 1 
have seen corps thus formed with good elements, ready to 
appear in the field in the course of a few weeks. The num- 
ber of officers required in such an organization of the army 
will occasion a trifling augmentation in its expense, but of no 
moment, when compared with the advantage of having all its 
cadre ready formed at the moment of war. The economy of 
time and expense, thus procured, will be understood by all 
who know the value of foresight and order, and the superior 
quality of such troops, by all military men. In fact, new 
corps will otherwise be no better at first than the militia, and 
cannot support it. 

I need scarcely add that depots of ordnance, arms and 
ammunition, approvisionment and forage, clothing and equip- 
ment, should be formed at the same time, and placed at a 
secure distance behind the armies, with some safe and easy 
communication between them. All roads and canals, ne- 
cessary for the armies to communicate, should be opened, 
and the time requisite for such movements be calculated with 
precision. 

We may then securely brave any invasion of our territo- 
ry; for before the enemy can have made an impression on 
those important points, which deserve to attract his efforts, 
and which will, by that time, be fortified, a corps of expe- 
rienced soldiers, led by military chiefs, and supported by the 
militia of the neighbouring states, will move against him ; and 
we trust that, in the contest, the spirit of patriotism and the 
consciousness of the noble cause which they defend, will 
ensure victory to our troops and to the American flag. 

We cannot however entirely prevent England from haras- 
sing our coasts by small predatory expeditions, putting us there- 
by to great trouble and expense, and fatiguing our militia by 



iil Chap. \r 

frequent duty, marches and countermarches. But we can re- 
taliate severely upon her. Our numerous privateers and our 
navy can pursue and almost destroy her trade on every sea, 
alarm her on her own coasts, and oblige her to divide her 
naval forces in every quarter. We can menace her colonies, 
we can conquer Canada. Invasion and conquest may seem a 
measure contrary to our republican institutions. But in fact 
this movement would be a defensive measure ; for by the 
natural situation of Canada, the British keep our whole 
northern frontier from Maine to Illinois in a constant state 
of alarm, and carry their hostilities in every part of it, oblige 
us to maintain on that immense frontier a great naval and 
military force, divide our means and attention, and surround 
our country ; whilst by occupying Quebec, or Montreal, or 
any single point on the eastern extremity of that line, we 
secure the whole of our northern and western frontier for 
ever, and are enabled to turn all our means and attention to 
the protection of our sea-coast. The rest of Canada must 
fall under the well managed efforts of any one of our western 
states. We trust that, by a system of defence thus organized 
and conducted, Britain would soon be weary of a fiuitless and 
hopeless contest, where the only injury she could do us, in- 
terrupting our trade, would be returned upon her tenfold, and 
where she would find herself unable to stop the progress of 
our country, or hurt its vital interests. 

Such, in the moment of war, will be the result of forming 
a good military establishment. But is it necessary, even in 
time of peace, that the army should remain a dead load upon 
the nation ? Undoubtedly not. The life of a soldier should 
be a life of constant labour and exercise. Turn these to the 
public account. The Romans, occupied with incessant la- 
bours, never suffered from diseases in their armies, whilst in 
Europe they arc more destructive than war. And (he listless 
indolence of a garrison life, in the wilderness of our frontiers, 
would be insupportable, without some employment, to keep 
up the health and spirits of (he soldier. 

11 



Chap. vr. 82 

In summer they should be employed under the direction of 
engineers in opening roads and canals, and constructing 
bridges and fortifications. The axe and shovel should be as 
familiar to their hands as the musket and bayonet. And as 
the officers should all be acquainted with the elements of 
field fortification, these habits would be of incalculable value 
in time of war. In the intervals of labour, military exer- 
cises, swimming, shooting at a mark, &c. should fill every mo- 
ment, and the scrubbing, polishing, and all the coxcombry of 
dress with which they are kept occupied in Europe, be given 
up. It is a fact, however ridiculous, that elegant white un- 
dresses were given to several British regiments of cavalry, to 
employ the soldiers in cleaning them. Nothing should be 
plainer than a soldier's dress. Convenience and uniformity 
should be its sole beauty. 

It will be highly useful to accustom them to remain under 
tents during a part of that season. Tents were latterly quite 
unknown in the French army. During five years service I 
never saw one. Curtailing all the necessaries of life in that 
manner, certainly facilitated the rapidity of our movements., 
but at an immense waste of health and life. 

The leisure of winter should be consecrated to forming the 
moral character and habits of the soldier, and instructing him 
theoretically in his service. The sub-officers especially 
should be examined on all the branches of their duty. Regi- 
mental schools on the Lancasterian plan, where all the sol- 
diers should be taught at least to read, write, and account, 
regimental libraries for the use of the officers, where books 
of history, geography, mathematics, and all kinds of military 
works should be at their disposal, would be of incalculable 
benefit, and serve to substitute the habits of decency, order, 
discipline and morality, to that drunkenness, to that gambling 
and dissipation in which ignorance and indolence so frequently 
plunge the military. Libraries might even be established for 
the men ; it is done in England. That idea might he carried 



83 Chap. vi. 

much farther. These schools might be of use to the neigh- 
bouring population, in those remote districts where our troops 
are usually quartered, and the regiments become centres of 
morality and instruction, instead of being, as they usually are, 
centres of vice and corruption. 

And would an order of men so constituted and so employ- 
ed be dangerous to the liberties of their country ? Would 
t he money expended in qualifying them to lead and direct 
the efforts of their inexperienced fellow-citizens, in the mo- 
ment of danger, be wasted? No. Far from forming a hete- 
rogeneous element in the constitution of the republic, such an 
army would be the most powerful instrument of her defence 
in time of war, and in time of peace a most useful, respecta- 
ble and honourable class of citizens. If attacked by regular 
disciplined forces, we must have forces of the same nature to 
repel them, and if it is better to have a good than a bad army, 
better to beat than to be beaten, we must train and discip- 
line them in time of peace to render their service effective 
in time of war. 

Let us, therefore, in viewing the ambitious and disorga- 
nizing designs of Britain, her immense means, her prepara- 
tions for warfare, and the rapid improvements of her milita- 
ry system, neither abandon ourselves to supine indolence, re- 
main unarmed and unprepared until the blow be struck, nor 
yield to terror and despondency on measuring the present 
disparity of our forces. Let us beware of any insidious at- 
tack against our union; let us never separate our interests, but 
organize ourselves, and fortify our frontiers, diffuse military 
knowledge by means of our military schools, and remedy the 
radical defects of our militia system, foster the infant estab- 
lishments of our navy, and give every encouragement to those 
brave men who defend the republic in the hour of danger. 
Let us not take parsimony for economy, nor indolence for 
security, and we have nothing to fear. We have the noblest 



Chap. vi. M 

country and cause to defend that ever nerved the hand or 
fired the heart of patriot soldier. The future happiness 
and liberty of the human race are perhaps confided to Ame- 
rica. She will not betray the trust. If we do not fail to 
ourselves, we may defy every enemy, and support against an 
opposing world the standard of freedom and Washington. 



NOTEb. 

NOTE T. 

Chapter i. pa<;e 11. 

The work of Chevalier Dupin has excited great attention in France. 
Tin- duke of Ragusa, (Marshal Marmont) who had been reared with 
Napoleon in the military school of Bryenne, and began his service in the 
artillery, presented to the Institute a very able report on that work, of 
which I have subjoined a translation in the Appendix, (No. 1) From the 
quantity of technical words, and formal phrases which it contains, I found 
it very difficult to translate, neither do I always agree with his excellency's 
opinions. His observations are sometimes trifling, and his encomiums 
exaggerated. But his report gives a very full idea of the present military 
force, and military improvements of Britain ; it contains important facts 
and matter. Neglecting therefore all ornaments of style, I have confined 
myself to rendering its meaning as closely, as strictly and as literally as 
was in my power. 

NOTE II. 

Chap. 1. page IS. — This expression, may seem rather strong in this 
country, where we are too apt to borrow from English writers all our 
notions of England. I do not mean to deny that the English troops 
were always very brave, very well drilled, well paid, well fed, well 
clothed, and made not only a very handsome appearance on the parade, 
but a very respectable one on the field of battle. But down to the 
present day, there existed no military establishments, no schools, no mili- 
tary instruction in Britain. The standing army was scarcely tolerated by 
the people ; the officers were very ignorant of the grand principles of tin ir 
profession, and promoted merely by wealth or parliamentary influence. 
Lloyd is the only English tactician worth mentioning. Their military 
administration was profuse and extravagant ; their artillery officers were 
mere cannon firers ; their engineers are to this day the worst in Europe, 
and even in the Spanish war, proved in the sieges of Badajoz, Burgos, and 
St. Sebastian, their ignorance and incapacity. The profusion of blood 



8(5 

which was spilt in these sieges and in the ridiculous assault of Bergen-Op» 
Zoom, was entirely owing to these blunders. 

Military science in modern times first began to be cultivated after the 
barbarous ages of chivalry in the Spanish and the Italian armies of Fer- 
dinand and Charles the Vth, led by Gonzalvo, De Ley va, Pescara, &c. In 
the civil and religious wars of the Netherlands and Germany, under 
prince Maurice of Nassau, D'Alva, Parma, Wallenstein, but especially 
under Gustavus Adulphusof Sweden, and the generals whom he formed, 
its theory was more deeply studied ; campaigns were calculated and 
movements combined. Those great generals had meditated upon the 
tactics of the ancients, and adapted theirs to the nature of the arms then 
used. In the next century, the whole science assumed a new form, from 
the vast improvements which took place in the armament of the troops, 
and more especially in the artillery; from the general progress of wealth, 
science and industry, the greater means put in the hands of the sovereigns, 
and the creation of the corps of engineers under Vauban. France, under 
Louis XIV., became the military model of Europe. Spain and Holland 
had declined, Austria had numerous and good armies, but France alone 
had great and scientific military establishments, military instruction, a 
good corps of engineers and artillery,and a general system of fortification. 
It is needless to cite the names of Turenne and Conde, Luxembourg, 
Villars, Catinat, Berwick, Vendome, &c. In the next century, Frederic 
of Prussia improved the tactics of the field, almost to perfection, 
although in the grand combinations of a campaign, his conceptions were 
not so vast as those of the French revolutionary generals : Russia and 
Prussia, two new nations, appeared on the political scene of Europe with 
excellent armies, but nothing more. The armies of France had declined 
after the death of Marshal Saxe, but her military establishments and 
institutions saved her at the period of the Revolution, enabled her to 
repel the efforts of all Europe, and to organize those means by which 
she played so great a part in the subsequent years. Since the fall of 
Napoleon, all the powers of Europe are endeavouring to imitate those 
establishments. 

During all this time England never figured as a military power. In her 
civil wars a great deal of rude bravery, but very little skill, was displayed 
on both sides. Prince Rupert, IretOn, Fairfax, and Cromwell himself, 
although a man of prodigious natural genius, were no tacticians ; their 
chief merit as generals consisted in a rude headstrong impetuosity and in 
the talent of acquiring the confidence of their men. Montrose and 
Lesley, who showed some more military skill, were formed in the wars 
of Sweden and Germany. In short, Marlborough is the only great 
general that England has produced from the age of the Edwards and 



87 

Henrys, to that of Wellington, but Marlborough was formed under 
Turenne, who foretold that he would one day succeed him. In the next 
generation, the valour of the British troops and the incapacity of their 
commanders, were equally displayed at Fontenoy and Dettingen. A 
handful of highlanders were near overturning the British empire, threw 
the whole country in terror and dismay, and their defeat procured to the 
duke of Cumberland a most ridiculous and exaggerated reputation, 
which he lost at Closterseven. 

Under the administration of Chatham the victories of the British 
troops in America were extravagantly praised by the vanity and ignorance 
of the national writers. And yet in the conquest of Havana and Canada 
their generals committed blunders that would have disgraced a schoolboy- 
But the superiority of their navy assured them an easy victory over an 
enemy who could receive no supplies, and the heroic death of the youn°- 
Wolfe, in the first battle where he commanded, eclipsed the fame of his 
much more skilful and able rival, Montcalm, who, with a handful of men, 
had triumphed during three years over all the British forces in America. 

During the revolutionary war, the blunders of the English generals 
were still greater : nothing could equal the ignorance and presumption of 
Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis and Burgoyne : their vague, desultory, unsys- 
tematicat movements, without object or combination, which terminated 
in the disgraceful inactivity of the two former, and the still more disgrace- 
ful capture of the two latter, present a singular contrast to those which 
the untutored genius of Washington, Greene, Gates, &c. suggested to 
the Americans. 

It was during the French revolutionary war, and very slowly and gra- 
dually, that the British armies began to be improved, and their military 
establishments to assume a regular and scientific form. Indeed, so im- 
periously was their attention drawn to this object, by the great contest in 
■which they were involved, and so universal were those military improve- 
ments to which France led the way, that their armies must necessarily 
have been ameliorated. I believe that under the administration of the 
Duke of York, they began to improve their military system. In Belgium, 
their troops made a very poor figure ; but in Egypt, under Sir Sidney 
Smith, A.bercrombie and Hutchinson, they appeared respectably, and in 
Spain, under Moore, and especially under the Duke of Wellington, they 
finally equalled the best troops in Europe. It is to be observed, that in 
all their recent improvements, they have chiefly imitated the French. 



88 



NOTE III. 

Chap. 1. page 19. — The finances of Great Britain present certainly an 
artificial and imaginary wealth, which, like the collection of the electric 
fluid, may he discharged at a single shock. Is the artificial credit of her 
paper money houndless and exhaustless ? We know that she can never 
pay off her debt, but can she afford to increase it at will, by paying the 
interest with an imaginary and fictitious value, whilst her trade and in- 
dustry, additionally loaded, must diminish, and those of the rest of the 
world increase? The approaching resumption or non-resumption of cash 
payments, will perhaps decide this question ; but this is not the only view 
in which it should be considered. 

The wealth of England is not entirely artificial: The knowledge, the 
general instruction, science and industry of the people, is wealth ; her 
excellent soil and agriculture, is wealth ; the power of machinery, ap- 
plied to her manufactures, was, several years ago, equal to the labour of 
100,000,000 of able men ; this is very great wealth ; and the actual riches 
and merchandise existing in the country, the cities, roads, canals, &c. are 
also wealth. Great and terrible will be the shock of national bankruptcy ; 
but after it,this real wealth will remain, increased in its value, and the repro- 
ducing powers, freed from the immense load with which they are charged, 
may possibly begin to act with renovated energy. Every individual in Bri- 
tain will be ruined; but from the great mass of information, and the habits of 
activity and industry which exist in that country, its commercial credit 
may be retrieved, its losses repaired, before trade has decidedly run in 
another channel, provided the government does not turn those very means 
in another direction, and afford, in war and plunder, a career to the des- 
perate enterprise of the people. 

If this great change should be accompanied by an amelioration of the 
government, it should be desired by all good men, and especially by all 
good Englishmen. But if that government survives the shock, it will, for 
a time, be stronger than ever. Freed from its load of debt, it will have 
the unembarrassed disposal of means, less in appearance, but more in 
reality. Its stores of destruction are laid in, and exist ; its navy and 
army, with all their immense materiel, exist, and are devoted to them ; 
their numbers pass 300,000 men. An official return of the 25th January, 
1819, laid before the house of commons, states the troops of the line 
alone at 109,810 non-commissioned officers and privates, 5852 officers, 
and 11,276 horses, of which 15,258, with 8516 foot guards, serve in Eng 



39 

land, 18,02S in Ireland, 13,280 in India, Sic. Add to these the navy, colo- 
nial corps, the native troops of Hindostan, the Hanoverian army, &c. 
and this is the state of peace. 

They will be enabled to strengthen this army, by the very misery of 
the people ; and thousands after thousands of starving wretches, when 
England ceases to be a manufacturing and industrious country, will seek 
for employment in its ranks, and be maintained at foreign expense. That 
government exerts at present its power, by the expensive system of cor- 
rupting the people: it may then throw off the mask, and rule by open 
force. In the mean time, it has interested almost every class, in keeping 
up the deception ; even the poor, empowered to vest in the public funds, 
as corporate bodies, the economies which they had laid up in the saving 
banks, are thereby interested in maintaining the present system. Those 
economies were stated, in the course of last year, to have amounted, 
in England alone, to £1,254,000 sterling. 



NOTE IV. 



Chap. 2. page 24. — List of articles shipped to the continent by Great 



Britain, from the year 1808 to 1813. 



Laid before parliament 



Countries. 


Cannon. 


Muskets. 


Barrels of 


Cannon 


Dozens of 








powder. 


cart. 


musket cart. 


Russia, 


148 


117,270 


800 


£42,1 12 


7,135,600 | 


Prussia, 


105 


1,417,270 


12,000 


34,750 


17,44)5,600 


Sweden, 




1,417.270 


4,000 




9,950,000 


Spain, 


545 


7,512,000 


45,000 


471,623 


90,180,000 


Portugal, 


14 


1,380,000 


2,317 


2,396 


19,000,000 


Germany, 


22 


1,390,000 


13,200 


3,800 


18,000,000 


Total, 


834 


13,234,410* 


77,317 


754,681 


161,761,200 



NOTE V. 



Chap, ^vage 51.— The military establishments of France, the first 
incontesJJPy in Europe, were administered with the strictest econo- 
my and the most admirable regularity. It was by that economy alone 
that she was enabled to bring them to such strength and perfection. Her 
fortifications were constructed at one-third cheaper than those of the 

* The French arsenals in the whole empire of Napoleon, with the aid of all the 
private fabrics, and in the period of their greatest activity, could only fabricate 
300,000 muskets in a year. Which was the most colossal power f which of the two 
«njoyed the greatest means. 

12 



90 

other powers on the continent, and probably ten times cheaper than ours. 
It was by these means that Vauban was enabled to repair three hundred 
and build thirty-five fortresses on a general system of defence round her 
frontiers, a measure (we cannot repeat it too often) which saved France 
at the time of the revolution. The simplicity and economy of that ad- 
ministration, was brought under the empire of Napoleon to still greater 
perfection. 

Before any permanent work was undertaken, its utility, in the general 
system of defence, and the purpose and object for which it was to be 
erected, were long and scrupulously debated. The expense was then 
calculated with the nicest accuracy and most exact detail, entering into 
all the elements of which that expense was to consist. A long expe- 
rience had fixed the principles of these valuations. The purpose and ex- 
pense were then compared, the funds provided, and not a spade nor hoe 
was allowed to touch the ground till these were ascertained. 

The same order and the same economy prevailed in all the other 
branches of the service, the fabrications of the artillery, the approvi- 
sionment of all the national and regimental stores, and arsenals, &c. 
The funds were provided upon the closest estimates, their employ was 
constantly inspected by the numerous officers of the administration, and 
superior officers, who mutually watched each other. And yet on the 
funds thus furnished, the regimental administrations generally contrived 
to make yearly economies, which were employed in interior improve- 
ments or laid up for unforeseen occasions. When the regiment in which 
I began my service, the 8th chasseurs, was destroyed in Russia, a long 
course of administrative economy had so amply provided our stores with 
armament, clothing, equipment for men and horses, inc. that we were 
enabled to reorganize it in a few weeks, with very little aid from govern- 
ment, and send to the army five hundred men, completely appointed. The 
Russian and Prussian armies were the cheapest in Europe. The Russian 
army about 50 years ago comprised 150,000 men, and cost #6,000,000 ; 
the Prussian, under Frederick the Great, 180,000 men, and cost 
#1 1,000,000; the Austrian 512,000,000. But these nations had only 
armies, and few military establishments, schools, fortifications, arsenals, 
and those of inferior quality. It must be observed, that their fltaies were 
all formed on a militia system, and recruited by the mMitia.^Wide Gui- 
bert, Mirabeau, fyc. 



NOTE VI. 

Chap. 4. page 54. — Mr. Dupin, in the second part of his Travels 
in England, which is more exclusively descriptive of the state of her 



91 

naval establishments, quotes a very remarkable passage from the report 
of the commissioners, charged in 1806 to examine the best mean'; of 
drawing the theory of naval constructions from the state of infancy in 
which it was yet in Great Britain. In that report, printed by order of 
parliament, they say : " The theory of naval constructions h;is been car- 
" ried to greater perfection in France than any where else. When we 
" built ships on the exact model of the French ships which we had taken, 
" and that we joined our talent for practical execution to the theoretical 
" knowledge of our rivals, the vessels which we constructed were acknow- 
ledged to be the best in our navy." What a crowd of reflections must 
arise in our minds in reading this passage. Notwithstanding the high re- 
putation and immense force of their navy, the English acknowledge ihat 
they have yet much to learn, and do not disdain to take lessons from fo- 
reigners, and even from enemies. Thus did the Romans in antiquity: 
thus should do every wise and enlightened nation. 



NOTE VII. 

Chap. 5. page 64.— 'This important rule, to construct every fort in the 
country, with a view to the part which it is destined to act in the general 
system of the national defence, cannot be too much insisted upon. From 
having neglected to organize such a system, on proper and scientific sur- 
veys, the greatest part, perhaps the whole of our defensive works, after 
all the expenditure which has been lavished upon them, will be found 
unfit for the purposes to which they are destined. They were merely 
erected with a view to cover certain points, but not with a view to the 
part which those points were to act, to their properties and relations with 
each other, as grand depots of military or naval mrans, points of attack 
or of descent, in first or second line, supporting or supported, covering 
communications, movements, or destined to concentrate forces, &tc. The 
detail of these principles would be endless. 



NOTE VIII. 

Chap. b. page 65. — If the memoirs, charts, and plans contained in the 
topographical office, be not kept with care, and fall into treacherous and 
unfaithful, or even into imprud< nt hands, they may be productive of the 
most serious evils, and direct the enemy in his attempts. The least in- 
convenience which will result from such carelessness, will be the useless 
and immense loss of time squandered in doing over and over the same 
surveys when works are to be erected. Indeed, the advantage of having 
all the basis and preliminarie* of every enterprise, of every plan of cam- 



92 

paign, of every civil or military work, thus drawn out ami laid down be- 
forehand, is so clear that it requires no comment. 



NOTE IX. 

Chap. 5. pag« 66. — In pursuing a course of experiments and improve- 
ments, which is always a useful occupation, our artillery should however 
remember that our military instruction is yet in its infancy, nor wait to 
establish our system of artillery on a uniform, simple and convenient 
footing, till they have run over the same round of errors and trials which 
have brought at length the European artillery to such a state of formida- 
ble perfection The first and essential point is to render our artillery uni- 
form, so that as many pieces and wheels as possible may be the same in 
all the calibers both of cannons and caissons, and thus replaced with ease 
when any one is put out of service, shattered, worn or broken. In fixing 
on a system of artillery, we had best begin by profiting of the experience 
of Europe. We can hardly expect to imagine any thing which has not 
been imagined and tried under every form in the course of three centu- 
ries of uninterrupted experiments, intense meditations, and constant im- 
provements in France. And after all the wars of the revolution, in every 
climate, in every nature of soil and country, mountains, plains, marshes 
and deserts, the French artillery, the most scientific in Europe, have uni- 
formly come to the conclusion that its system, with very slight improve- 
ments, was brought to perfection about forty or fifty years ago, under the 
direction of the celebrated Gribeauval. The improvements which some 
officers of brilliant talent and imagination, Montalembert, Congreve, 
&c. have since attempted, have generally been given up as futile and in- 
convenient. 

NOTE X. 

Chap. 5. page 70. — In the course of this work, I have always considered 
the ordnance department as distinguished from the artillery ; but why 
they are thus divided in two departments I could never understand. 
England is the only country of Europe where this disposition exists, either 
because it was so established at first, or because it was thought that the 
immense quantity of armament which that country fabricates, required a 
separate corps, occupied with no other functions. But even in England 
this system is vicious- The advantage of uniting these functions in the 
artillery is obvious and clear. The best judges of the fabrication of arms 
are those who use them and try them constantly : the theory of that fabri- 
cation which requires such accurate and experimental knowledge, is best 
improved by practice, and the practice by theory. The corps of the ar- 



03 

tiilery loses much of its value by this division of its labours ; it becomes* 
mere corps of cannon firers. 

In France (and the artillery in all the rest of Europe was more or less 
modelled upon the Trench) the young officer destined to that service, after 
two or three years of preparatory studies, spent two years at first in the 
polytechnic school, to acquire general mathematical information, and as 
many afterwards in the school of application of mathematical science, 
to the particular service of the artillery. He entered then as'econd lieu- 
tenant into an arsenal, to study and practise the fabrication of armament, 
powder, projectiles, fireworks, he. He passed into a regiment of artillery 
as first lieutenant : when promoted to the rank of captain in second, he 
returned to the arsenals, and when he rose to the first captaincy, took the 
command of a company. On his next promotion, he became a sous di- 
recteur of artillery, and superintended the fabrics ; lie then passed to the 
command of a battalion or squadron of heavy or light artillery, to the di- 
rection of an arsenal, the command of a regiment, &.c. The construction 
of all batteries and military reconnaissances, conjointly with the engi- 
seers, the administration of the armament and warlike approvisionment 
«f armies, the erection of temporary bridges on pontoons, made part of 
his attributions Thus, in the course of his service, an officer of artillery 
became perfectly acquainted with the fabrication of armament in the ar- 
senals and all its theory, with its properties and use in the. field, with the 
command and administration of troops, both of horse and foot, and was 
a finished officer by the time that he had reached the higher ranks of his 
profession- The artillery-furnished excellent staff and general officers : 
Napoleon, Pichegru and Marmont were formed in that service. In this 
point of view it would be of invaluable use in America. 



NOTE XI. 

Chap. 5. page 71. — A. slight review of the composition and functions of 
the corps of engineers in* France, will show what importance was attached 
to it in that country. Till lately, France was the only country which had 
such an establishment ; the engineers of all the other powers of Europe, 
with the exception of a few eminent and self-taught individuals, were very 
bad. Holland, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Bavaria, have however pro- 
duced some men of science and talent in that profession ; Coehorn, Lands- 
berg, Glasser, Virgin, Rosard, Stc. 

The corps of engineers in France was divided in several classes, applied 
separately to the civil, military or naval services- So numerous and im- 



94 



portant are the cares which each of these services require from an engi- 
neer, so abstruse the calculations and meditations necessary to carry them 
to perfection, that the advantages of this division of labour are evident at 
first view. Brought up in the same preliminary schools, the general in- 
struction of these classes was similar and uniform, their rank and respec- 
tability the same ; they often co-operated either with each other or witfe 
the officers of artillery in the same works. 

The topographical engineer might be said to lay the ground-work for 
the others to work upon ; they depended on the good and intelligent exe- 
cution of his surveys, and on their being adapted to the purpose for which 
they were required, either for establishing systems of military or naval 
defence, or opening proper communications, roads, bridges and canals- 
Ihe topographer was not, therefore, considered in France as a mere sur- 
veyor or landscape painter, but as a most useful and important officer, 
equal in rank and respectability to the rest of the corps of engineers- In 
the staffs of armies, their services were considered as indispensable. I need 
only mention the names of Berthier, the friend and companion of Napo- 
leon, Generals Bacler D'Albe, Vallogne, Colonels Henry, Puissant, &c. to 
show the rank and character of these officers. 

Another class of engineers was exclusively charged with naval con- 
8 truct.ons, ship building, & c . Inferior as the French navy was latterly to 
the English, in this branch it was superior, by the public confession of the 
best judges in England. (Vide note 6.) 

Another class, applied to the civil service, was charged with the con- 
struction, reparation, preservation and administration of all public 
works, buildings, roads, bridges, canals, fee. The beautv, the grandeur 
and convenience of these works, are known to all who have travelled 
in France ; their solidity, and the admirable order and cheapness of their 
administration, are not equally so. Every project was maturely discussed 
before it was put in execution, and then executed under the direction, in- 
spection and administration of that excellent corps of officers, who'had 
all received a profound, scientific and uniform education in the same 
schools, and worked on the same principles. 

The corps of military engineers comprised seven generals, 102 supe 
rior officers, 484 subaltern officers, besides six companies of miners, 576 
men, and four battalions of sappers or pioneers, 7092 men ; the«e' last 
were chiefly charged with superintending the details of the work traced 
by the engineers, a most useful establishment. For it does not suffice 
to trace works; they must be conducted by workmen who understand 
them. Such a corps on a small scale would be very desirable here. 



95 

The corps of military engineers was not merely charged with tracing 
Uie military works required of them, on plans adapted to the purpose to 
which they were destined, and to the sites where they were situated ; they 
were also charged with their construction, reparation, preservation, and 
all the immense details of the administration of these labours. The ad- 
mirable order and cheapness of that administration, I need not refer to. 
Military roads, bridges and canals, the military topography of the fron- 
tiers, the framing of military memoirs, defensive or offensive, military 
reconnaissances, exposing the best means of, employing their services on 
erery occasion, entered also into their attributions. 



NOTE XII. 

Chap. 6. page 77.— We have subjoined in our Appendix (No. 2), the 
•xcellent report of Mr. Calhoun, with that of General Bernard and 
Colonel M'Ree annexed. Until these schools be established we ca;i never 
expect to have a good army, but we must remember that four ye.irs of 
preparatory studies, and two of attendance at the school of application, 
are necessary to form a good engineer. 



APPENDIX No. I. 



Report of the Marshal Duko of Ragusa, on a work, entitled, u Travels in 
England and Essay on the Improvements of the Artillery and Engineer 
Departments in that Country" hy Chevalier Dupin, Corresponding 
Member of the Jnsttitute. 

^Royal Institute of France.) (Extracted from the Maritime and Colonial Annals.) 

The Perpetual Secretary of the Academy of Mathematical Sciences, certi- 
fies that the following extract is taken from the minutes of the meeting of Mon- 
day, 23d March, 1818. 

The Academy has commissioned me, with Messrs. De Prony and Dc 
Rosily, to report on a Manuscript, entitled, "Travels in England and 
Essay on the Improvements of the Artillery, he. by Mr. Dupin, Naval 
'Engineer. This task we are going to fulfil. 

The author undertook his voyage with all the means of rendering it 
useful in its results, the best recommendations, the talents necessary to 
see and examine with profit, and an ardent love for science, by which he 
had been already more than once distinguished. Mr. Dupin was uni- 
formly well received in England.* 

In his manuscript he has chiefly attended to the state of the materiel 
of war in that country ; but in our account of his interesting work, wc- 
shall not confine ourselves strictly to follow the order in which he has 
arranged his subject. 

1st. Military Establishments. — Mr. Dupin has visited with atten- 
tion the chief military establishments of Great Britain, Woolwich, Ports- 
mouth, Chatham, he. , 

* Chiefly by the most distinguished military characters of all ranks, General Hut- 
chinson, the former commander-in-chief of the army of Egypt, Generals Ferguson, 
Long, Robert Wilson, the celebrated military writer, the Colonels of artillery and en- 
gineers, Mudge, Chapman, Elphinstone, Miller, Griffin, Captains Colby, Rutherford, 
&c. 



97 

Every thing relative to the personnel and materiel of the artillery, both 
in the land and sea service, and all fortifications in England, depend on 
one branch of the war department* Woolwich is the most important 
arsenal of that country, and comprises workshops (atteliers) of all kinds 
for the fabrications of the artillery, a foundry, magazine, barracks, a mili- 
tary school, &.c; in short, all that is necessary for instruction and for pre- 
paring, preserving, and putting in service the materiel both of the land and 
sea service. 

Every thing at Woolwich is on a grand and even magnificent scale; 
the neighbouring grounds have been drained at great expense; the. Thames, 
bordered with granite quays, and the sands deposited by the river, which 
seemed accumulated beyond the power of man to remove, dispersed by 
a steam-engine of prodigious power. Canals, with well-devised sluices, 
convey the transports to the very door of the store-houses, which are 
equally remarkable for their vast size, their elegant and convenient con- 
struction, the care with which they are kept, the canals which divide 
them, to guard against the communication of fire, the iron bridges which 
connect them, and the immense and well classed materiel which they 
contain. 

Most of the fabrications for the use of government are carried on at 
Woolwich, the other establishments being mere depots. Powder and 
small arms are not fabricated, but purchased by government and proved 
before they are received. The artillery cast at Woolwich is all brass. The 
iron pieces are chiefly cast at the cannon foundry in Scotland, a most 
important establishment, where all the processes of the manufacture have 
been brought to a point of singular perfection. 

The parks of Portsmouth and Chatham are, next to Woolwich, the 
chief depots of the British artillery, especially for the sea service. The 
same grandeur is displayed in their works, the same care and oider 
appears in their details, the same quantity of materiel is deposited in them. 

2d. Fortifications. — Portsmouth and Chatham, those important 
positions, containing such a mass of military stores, are fortified, and their 
works were strengthened at the time that an invasion was feared from the 
French army encamped at Boulogne. Those of Portsmouth are re- 
markable from the judicious management of the waters to augment their 
defence. At Chatham the casemates constructed in the works, suffice to 
lodge the whole corps of sappers, miners, and pontoneers. General!) 1 1 
h nothing remarkable in the fortifications of England. They are con 

t A ticious disposition. {Vide notelO. cha?. 5 • 

13 



98 

structed from French books. Vauban is the chief oracle of the British 
engineers as of all others ; Carnot's works are esteemed ; some of Mon- 
talembert's they tried, but they proved too expensive, even for the 
finances of Great Britain. Some less important but ingenious details, pro- 
posed by French authors, have been executed, and towers (1) of a simpler 
construction than ours, built on the coast. A. plan of Gibraltar in relief) 
represents the multiplied casemates by which the English have endeavour- 
ed to reduce to absolute absurdity attacks which were already considered 
impracticable. 

3. Machinery. — The most remarkable circumstance in the British 
artillery is the machinery employed in its fabrications The habitual use 
of machinery has made such progress in England, and even the smallest 
manufactures are supported in that country by such ingenious inventions, 
tbat her great military fabrics must necessarily have received proportional 
improvements. The English value man at a very high rate (2); their 
object is to reduce his labour as much as possible to that mere direction, 
which must be exercised by an intelligent being, and to draw from the 
powers of brute matter or animal nature all their moving forces. The 
steam-engine, the hydraulic press, and various combinations of these two 
machines, are at this day the chief agents of British industry. The work 
o.f Mr. Dupin gives some very clear and useful details on such machines 
as he had occasion to visit. 

The steam-engine is carried to a high degree of perfection in Britain, 
It is really a wonderful sight to see it work with so little noise and so 
much regularity, so precise, so punctual, and yet so powerful, that it 
produces the effect of 200 or S0O horses, with a rapidity which can be 
augmented to any required degree of swiftness. 

The hydraulic press of Pascal, improved by Bramah, furnishes also 
powers which can be diversely applied. By means of that press, the 
British squeeze to the smallest possible volume their military stores, 
equipments, provisions, especially their forage, and thus render their 
conveyance so easy, that in Portugal their armies always enjoyed plenty 
before a starving enemy. 

In their arsenals, one single man, to whom the lever of Bramah gives 
the lifting strength of fifty, presents to the instruments animated by the 
steam-engine, all kinds of materials that seem to be fashioned by their 
own voluntary motion. Wood, iron and brass are presented to the 

(1) Mavtello towers. 

(2) This is certainly a mistaken notion. No people ralue the life of man so cheaply, 
but machinery is cheaper. 



99 

anoving force of saws, planes, knives, wedges, files and augers : they 
assume in a thousand different ways every kind of curve in their surfaces, 
and every possible shape, without noise, without any apparent effort and 
with inconceivable rapidity. 

The emperor of Russia, in his visit to England, purchased two BramahVs 
presses and thirty steam-engines, not with the view of depositing them as 
4 barren deceration in his museums, but of employing them in his 
arsenals. Shall we observe that the steam-engine, originally derived from 
the discovery of a Frenchman, is at this day one of the most powerful 
means of the prosperity of Britain ? that the hydraulic press, a French 
invention, is one of England's most useful machines ? that the mechanician 
Brunei, a Frenchman, now directs the chief mechanical labours of Great 
Britain I What has not been invented by French genius? and what is the 
invention of which British policy has not availed itself. 

4. Military Instruction. — A good instruction being the first founda- 
tion of all success, the English, for some years past, have applied with 
redoubled care to military education. They chiefly endeavour to form a 
corps of artillery and engineers, able to rival those of any other tuition. 
In 1106 they established a school for that purpose at Woolwich, on ;i 
large scale, constructed vast buildings, with all their useful dependencies, 
halls, dwelling-rooms, laboratories, cabinets of models, a library, fcc. Pro 
fessors were invited, installed and lodged, concourses opened for the elec- 
tion of scholars, in which the candidates were examined after one year of 
preparatory studies, and those who were admitted, entertained four years 
in the school at the expense of government. Their studies were chiefly- 
directed to mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics, fortifications, 
topography and geodesy, ballistics, the application of the theory of all 
these sciences to military practice, French, drawing, fencing, dancing, &tc. 

The annual examinations are conducted at Woolwich with great im- 
partiality. The value of each science is represented by a given dumber, 
proportioned to its importance; the value of the scholar's examination, 
by a portion of it, proportioned to his progress in that science, and the 
sum total of each scholar's number in all his classes, gives the estimated 
value of his instruction, according to which he is afterwards ranked and 
promoted. This method, which necessarily excites great emulation, was 
adopted, as we believe, in imitation of the institutions of our Polytechnic 
school (1). 

Schools, well kept, and well organized, have been established for the 

(1) These ameliorations are due to Col. Mudgc, the present Gov. M.K S. of Londbn 
sad Correjp. Jnat. France. 



100 

privates, as well as for the officers (1). They learn in these school 9, 
reading and writing, arithmetic, and a tincture of geometry and me- 
chanics ; nor are these lessons merely an illusive and pedantic exhibition, 
in a country where every class of workmen and mechanics have got 
excellent elementary treatises of the usual and profitable application of 
scientific theories to the practice of their professions. 

Those schools for the privates, have also libraries attached to them ; 
and so much has a taste for reading spread itself in the army, that lately 
a regiment sailing for the colonies, subscribed to purchase a set of books, 
which government immediately augmented at its own expense. In 
general the British government neglects nothing to secure the services of 
useful men, by rendering their condition agreeable. At Woolwich a 
whole street of small but neat houses has been constructed, to provide 
with isolated and private dwellings, those cannoneers who have families. 

At the school of Chatham our author saw the troops exercising on a 
vast ground, prepared for the purpose. They raised intrenchments, at- 
tacked them, (the sappers and miners hy their peculiar modes of attack) 
whilst the pontoneers, in silent order, manoeuvred with their pontoons 
at the word of command, rapidly deploying and reploying them (forming 
and breaking up the bridge). The English were far behind us in military 
instruction twenty years ago; since that time they have studied our 
institutions, our wars, successes, and faults, our books and experience. 
They copy us, it is true, but the English are apt scholars, and have often 
surpassed their masters. 

Materiel of the Artilleri. — In the depot of Woolwich alone are 
above 10,000 cannon, and an immense number of mortars, howitzers, 
carronades, and swivels. The emperor of Russia was astonished at find- 
ing such a mass of armament, &c. in a nation that has so profusely 
supplied all kinds of arms, since twenty-five years, to all who would 
use them. He was told that before the war, this depot contained 25,000 
cannon, and other materiel in proportion ; besides which, enormous quan- 
tities were furnished by the continual labour of the private foundries. 

The parks of Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, although smaller, con- 
tain also a great quantity of artillery. Every object is ranged in these 
magazines with the most perfect order and exquisite neatness, classed by 
calibers, taken to pieces, packed, embaled and corded, ready for em- 
barkation, so that, in time of the profoundest peace, England, in twenty- 
four hours after the order is given, can despatch to any part of the globe, 
<nn immense mass of military stores, and means of destruction. From 

(1) Aa excellent institution, and deserving imitation, 



101 

time to time, they are visited, unbaled, cleaned, and then packed up 
again in their cases and barrels. 

Enormous quantities of highly finished projectiles lie in the arsenals, 
some in piles of 20,000 or 30,000, others loaded, adapted to their car- 
tridges, (ensabotes) and packed in boxes and caissons. They contain a 
number of mortars to fire granadoes, for the defence of towns, complete 
equipages of mountain artillery, a quantity of, cast and forged iron car- 
riages for the defence of the coasts and colonies, place carriages, and 
coast carriages, which are merely naval carriages on frames, turning in 
the French manner, incendiary balls and carcasses of all kinds, he. — 
It did not enter into our traveller's plan to enumerate the particulars 
of the general system of field artillery, recently adopted in the British ar 
my. We know that it is constructed at great expense, with great care and 
intelligence, and possesses some remarkable advantages as to the facility of 
being easily embarked and disembarked, a condition indispensable in 
England. 

Improvements and Innovations in the British Artillery. — 
The British officers of artillery have been lately very busy about improve- 
ments, but although their discoveries have been announced with some 
ostentation, it does not appear that they have invented any thing very 
formidable or destructive. In 1811, incendiary balls, of a kind known 
a long time since in France, were tried before the admiralty as a new 
invention; they have howitzers loaded with shot(l), to which they attach 
a great importance. The best judges of such inventions are those against 
whom they are directed, and their effect upon our troops proves that we 
should adopt them (2). 

Amongst the different experiments which have been undertaken in 
England for the sake of improvement, those begun by Dr. Hutton (3) at 
Woolwich, on the tir (on the swiftness and direction of the projectilejof the 
artillery, are most remarkable. These experiments are continued by the 
chiefs and professors of the arsenal and military school. Much talent, care 
and perseverance, and a great deal of expense, have been applied to them. 
They will teach to the artillery of other nations, those elementary prin- 
ciples of ballistics which are yet too little known. A most exact pendu- 
lum, of very large dimensions, is employed in these experiments, and the 
wheeling disks, invented by a French officer, (4) are sometimes used. 

(1) Shrapnell shells. 

(2) In writing this passage, the duke of Ragusa probably thought of the battle of 
Salamanca, where he had been wounded by one of these *hells. It is the opinion of 
the best judges, that but for his wound, he would have gained the battle. 

(3) See a full account of these experiments, In Gay de Vernon, toI. i. chap. »ii. 
■o. 48, p. 102-116. Paris edition of 1805. 

(4) Col. Grobert. 



102 

Mr. Dupin was agreeably surprised to find the British officers trying 
some experiments which he had proposed in France, to ascertain the es- 
sential properties of the large timber employed in constructions. In gene- 
ral, the spirit of military improvement has taken a grand and decisive 
character in Britain. In some affairs, they suffered from our lancers; they 
immediately organized corps of lancers ; in others, they were charged by 
our cuirassiers, and whilst the London papers inveighed against them, the 
British general, like an able and enlightened chief, went in person to visit 
those manufactories and work-shops, at Paris, where our cuirasses are 
fabricated. 

Several experiments have latterly been made for lightening the heavy 
artillery, especially for the sea service, for however secure the British navy 
may appear in the possession of its present supremacy, their government 
still apply themselves with ardour to improve it. 

Generals Congreve and Bloomfield have also turned their thoughts to 
wards lightening the weight of the heavier calibers of the artillery. Gene- 
ral Congreve's cannons were cited at first as possessing some wonderful 
and particular advantages over those of General Bloomfield. Though these 
may be exaggerated, it appears, from repeated and exact experiments, 
that they are actually superior, and both have some considerable advan- 
tages over the ordinary artillery for the particular services to which they 
are destined. 

General Congreve is the most active promoter of every innovation in 
the British artillery. He has occupied himself very much about the con- 
struction of all kinds of ordnance carriages, and published a work on the 
subject, but in which we found nothing but what we had frequently read 
in French authors, especially in Montalembert. He has, however, taken 
for that work a patent, which if it cannot confer upon him the glory of a« 
inventor, secures to him the valuable monopoly of the sale of these carria- 
ges to the armateurs, although, were it not for his patent, they might easily 
have constructed them from French books. These inventions have, never- 
theless, been appreciated, at least by the public, with that partiality which 
so easily attaches itself in England to every thing that touches the national 
glory. 

The chief title of General Congreve to fame, is the invention of those 
rockets that bear his name. Before they were introduced in England, 
they were used by the Indians, who employed th'm in the defence of 
Seringapatam Their use was proposed in France, where they were re- 
jected as producing more noise than effect. 



103 

It is generally believed, or at least asserted in England, although with- 
out the smallest foundation, that the rockets hail a most powerful effect in 
the last war, especially at the battle of Leipsick. The artillery of several 
powers are now seriously studying their properties. We hope that the 
French artillery, which has some right to give examples, will not follow 
this one. For, except on a very few occasions, those rockets have no mili- 
tary effect whatsoever, and it would be more for the good of humanity! 
than of the military profession, that no more powerful weapons were used 
in time of war. 

The English use rockets of all calibers, for the land and sea service, 
against the infantry, the cavalry, &c. ; they have incendiary rockets, others 
loaded with shells, &c. To these General Congreve has added a new 
variety, which is indeed of his own invention. His new rockets carry a 
parachute, which unfolding itself majestically at the very top of the curve 
which the rocket describes, supports sometimes a bomb, destined to carry 
destruction on some ill-fated city, (provided it meets with a favourable 
■wind) sometimes an incendiary ball, which, like some blazing comet, casts 
its glaring light upon the nightly movements of the enemy. As General 
Congreve's genius has soared to such high inventions, we cannot foresee 
where he intends to stop. His modesty had probably rendered him too 
diffident of his powers, when he went no farther than to assert to one of 
the great dukes of Russia, that had the war continued, he would have 
enabled the British army to do without cannon or musketry- 

Conclusion. — Besides the above-mentioned details, the manuscript of 
Mr. Dupin contains some very useful descriptions of the naval artillery, of 
the armament of ships, of the topographical labours undertaken under the 
direction of Colonel Mudge, &.c An interesting description lays before the 
reader's eyes the magnificent tableau of the Thames at London, loaded 
and surrounded with such monuments of power, riches and industry. 

Mr. Dupin, in pursuing his travels, has sent us two other manuscripts, in 
which he more particularly treats of the navy. An enterprise so useful 
and so important, conducted with such praise-worthy zeal, and accom- 
plished with such talent, will no doubt draw attention and encouragement 
upon that young engineer, who has already honourably distinguished 
himself. Your commissioners conclude their report by proposing to you 
to print in the Collection des Savants Etrangers the excellent work of Mr. 
Dupin. 

(Signed) De Rosily, 

De Phony, 

Marshal Dtke of Raglsa. 
Approved and adopted by thp Academy, and certified an exact copy 
conformable to the original, by the Perpetual Secretary, Chevalier of St. 
Michel and St. Louis. Delambre. 



104 
APPENDIX No. II. 



Letter from the Secretary of War, to the Chairman of the Military Commit- 
tee, upon the subject of an additional Military Academy, and a School 
of Practice. 

DEPARTMENT OF WAR. 

SIR, 15th January, 1319. 

In reply to that part of your letter, of the 30th of November? 
which requests my opinion on the expediency of establishing one or more 
additional military academies, and their places of location, and such other 
information and facts as you may deem proper to communicate on these 
subjects, with the probable annual expenses of these establishments, I 
have the honour to make the following statement: 

The number of cadets now authorized by law, is two hundred and fifty, 
who are divided into four classes ; the cadets of one of which, every year, 
terminate their studies, and are promoted into the army. As the academy 
is now nearly full, it is probable that the number which will annually ter- 
minate their studies, and, consequently, will be candidates for promotion, 
will not be. much short of fifty. The number of vacancies in the army 
which have occurred, from the 1st of August, 18J6, to the 1st of May, 
1318, has been one hundred and forty-eight, or about eighty-four per an- 
num ; but, as it is probable that the causes which have operated to pro- 
duce so many vacancies in this time have been accidental, and conse- 
quent on the change from active service to the inactivities of a peace 
establishment, there will not, it is believed, in future be so many ; and that 
the cadets who will annually terminate their studies at West Point, will 
be equal, or nearly so, to the annual average vacancies. In this view of 
the subject, an additional military academy would not now be required. 
But it seems to me, that the question ought not to be determined, by a 
reference simply to the wants of our military peace establishment, which, 
from our geographical position, and the policy of our government, will 
always bear a email proportion to the population of the country, and to 
our military establishment in time of war. So far from graduating the 
number or extent of our military academies, by the want of the army in 
time of peace, the opposite principle would, probably, be more correct ; 
that, in proportion as our regular military establishment is small, the go- 
vernment ought to be careful to disseminate, by education, a knowledge 
©f the art of war. The army itself is a practical school of this art, 
which, except in the higher branches, may, where it bears a large propor- 



105 



tion to the population of the country, supersede other modes of per- 
petuating or disseminating this indispensable art. But, in a country situ- 
ated as ours is, with a small standing army, and far removed from any 
power from which we have much to fear, the important knowledge of 
the art of defending our shores, will, in a long peace, without the particu- 
lar patronage of the government, be nearly lost. The establishment of 
military academies is the cheapest and safest mode of producing and per- 
petuating this knowledge. The government ought to furnish the means 
to those who are willing to bestow their time to acquire it. The cadets 
who cannot be provided for in the army, will return to private life ; but, 
in the event of war, their knowledge will not be lost to the country. The 
government may then avail itself of their military science, and, though 
they may not be practically acquainted with all the details of duty in an 
army, they will acquire it in a much shorter time, than those who have 
not had the advantage of a military education. No truth is better sup- 
ported, by history, than that, other circumstances being nearly equal, 
victory will be on the side of those who have the best instructed officers. 
The duties of a soldier are few and simple, and, with well instructed 
officers, they can be acquired in a short time ; as our own experience, 
and that of other countries, has satisfactorily proved. To form competent 
officers, in the present improved state of the art of war, is much more 
difficult, as an officer, besides a knowledge of the duties belonging to the 
soldier, has others of a more difficult nature to acquire, and which can 
only be acquired by long experience, or by a regular military education. 

With these views, I would recommend one additional military acade- 
my. It ought to be placed where it would mutually accommodate the 
southern and western portions of our country, which are the most remote 
from the present institution. 

Besides an additional academy, I would submit, for the consideration 
of the committee, the propriety of establishing a school of practice, to 
be fixed near the seat of government. On this important subject, I re- 
spectfully annex, as a part of this communication, a report from General 
Bernard and Colonel M'Ree, to this Department ; in which the subject 
is so fully discussed, as to supersede the necessity of any further obser- 
vations. 

The expenses of erecting the necessary buildings for an additional 
military academy, on a scale as extensive as that at West Point, would 
cost about one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, of which sum, how- 
ever, but a small part would be required for this year. The current ex- 
pense of the institution would (excluding the pay of the cadets, which i"- 

14 



106 



sixteen dollars per month, and two rations per day,) probably amount to 
about twenty-two thousand dollars per annum. 

For the school of practice, there would be but little expense, except 
the erection of the necessary buildings for the accommodation of the 
institution. The pay of the superintendent and professors, should they 
be even taken from the citizens, would not exceed eight thousand five. 
hundred dollars, which would constitute nearly the whole of the current 
expense, as the lieutenants of artillery and engineers, while at the insti- 
tution, will not receive any additional pay or emoluments. The expense 
of the buildings may be estimated at eighty thousand dollars, of which, 
however, but a small part would be required for the present year. 
I have the honour to be, 

Your most obedient servant, 

J. C. CALHOUN. 

Hon. R. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee 
on Military Aflaira, House of Representatives. 



Considerations on the Course of Instruction necessary for ike Officers of 
the different arms of an Army. 

Circumstances of locality; the nature of the operations of war; and 
the variety of the means employed for the purposes of destruction and 
preservation, have naturally led to the subdivision of an army into several 
parts; which differ in their manner of combating, but which are also 
intended to render reciprocal aid to each other, to co-operate most effica- 
ciously to the same end, and to constitute, when in action, but one com- 
bined whole. 

This subdivision existed among the ancients, as it does among the mo- 
derns ; and with both, (the absolute and relative numerical force of these 
subdivisions being supposed nearly equal) the systems of war have been 
uniformly more perfect, and productive of greater results, in proportion as 
the several parts were better calculated to act with promptitude, preci- 
sion, and in concert. These parts are designated in modern armies by 
the word arm ; and consist of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. 
Each of these arms acts occasionally as principal or accessary. In a bat- 
tle the infantry is in general the principal arm ; while the three others 
are more or less accessaries; in the pursuit of a retreating army, the ca- 
valry becomes the principal ; and in a siege, the artillery and engineers 
are the principal arms, and the rest are merely great auxiliaries. 



107 

Among the means which modern discipline employs, to give the great- 
est effect to the combined action of these arms, is instruction. And here, 
the same motives which have resorted to a subdivision of labour, as a 
powerful cause of perfection in objects of general industry, have also led 
to a subdivision of military instruction, as most productive of that concert 
and efficienay desirable in the operations of an army. This instruction} 
and the objects and advantages of its subdivision, are the subjects of pre- 
sent consideration. 

To obtain, by the aid of military instruction, greater effect in the particu- 
lar or combined employment of the different arms, two modes immediately 
present themselves : First, That each arm should be composed of indi- 
viduals vsrsed exclusively in the theory and practice of that arm ; Second, 
That the individuals composing each arm, should be instructed equally in 
the theory and practice of all the other arms. The first of these methods 
is insufficient ; because, in giving to each individual merely the knowledge 
necessary to the duties of his own arm, it leaves him deficient of what is 
necessary to connect the operations of that arm with the operations of the 
rest, as parts of one general system. The second is impracticable ; be- 
cause it is the privilege of but few individuals to possess that facility of in- 
tellect which is requisite to embrace four branches of knowledge, as exten- 
sive as are those in question, and to practise them all, with that correct- 
ness and promptitude, which is the peculiar advantage of such as devote 
themselves principally to but one of these branches. In order to avoid 
both of these inconveniences, the. theoretical and practical knowledge ne- 
cessary in the conduct and operations of an army, has been divided into 
two distinct classes ; the one embracing whatever is common to all the 
arms ; the other confined to what particularly appertains to each arm. 
A consequent and similar division has followed in the instruction ; the 
first branch to include what is necessary and useful to the service of every 
arm ; the second to include the theory and practice of each arm in par- 
ticular. Hence the necessity of an elementary, or common school, wher» 
the knowledge common to every arm, should be given alike to all who 
are intended for the army; and a school of a higher order, for the pur- 
pose of increasing (when necessary) the elementary knowledge which has 
previously been acquired to the extent demanded, and teaching its appli- 
cation to the particular objects and duties of each arm, which constitute a 
school of application. In those countries which have large military estab- 
lish ments v there is a school of application for each arm. But those na- 
tions who, in time of peace, keep but a feeble military force on foot, find 
it advantageous to unite, as far as possible, these different schools of ap- 
plication in one ; where such as are admitted for the service of those arms 
which demand a more advanced theoretical, or more varied practical 
knowledge, receive their last degree of academical instruction. In this 



108 

last case, the students at the school of application receive likewise two 
kinds of instruction : 1st. That which is common to the several arras to 
which they are destined ; and £d, that which is exclusively necessary to 
the arm in which they are respectively to serve. 

Among all nations possessing military academies, the schools of appli* 
cation for such as are destined for the infantry and cavalry, are the regi 
ments of the army in which they are to serve. It is on joining and doing 
duty with their respective regiments, that they learn to apply the instruc- 
tion received at the elementary school, and acquire whatsoever relates to 
the discipline, the conduct, administration, and legislation of troops. * 

This cannot be the case, however, with those destined for the artillery 
and engineers, or the topographical corps. They are all, more or less, lia- 
ble to be employed separately, and immediately after leaving the school > 
and are deprived of the advantages peculiar to the officer of infantry or 
cavalry, of making their first essays in their professional duties, under the 
eyes of their chiefs, or of those who have preceded them ; and being un- 
assisted by the advice or opinions of their superiors in rank, knowledge, 
and experience, they are not only left without the means of obtaining the 
instruction of which they are yet deficient, but are also frequently exposed 
in the execution of the duties confided to them, to compromit the public 
service by the commission of errors, which too often lead to irreparable 
misfortunes, and which are productive, at least, of a wasteful expenditure 
of public property, always beyond, sometimes exceeding an hundred fold, 
the expense of giving a proper education to the individual who has not 
been qualified to exercise his profession, with satisfaction to himself, or 
utilitj r to his country. 

These considerations alone appear to us sufficient to show the advan- 
tage, if not necessity, of dividing the course of military instruction between 
two schools ; the one elementary, and the other a school of application. 

The elementary school at West Point has hitherto been very inferior 
as such ; and altogether inadequate to the objects for which it was esta- 
blished. A project has been presented, however, calculated to place this 
school upon the footing of the most perfect of the kind which exist. As 
to a school of application, there is none. The degree of instruction, 
given to the cadets at the school of West Point, has heretofore been for 

* In the military schools of infantry and cavalry in France, theoretical lessons in these 
branches of military instruction were given to the scholars; and for the sake of unifor- 
mity in that instruction, these courses were \ery useful. The service of the depots 
ierired afterward* as a school of application- 



109 

the most part limited to a general acquaintance with those brandies of 
knowledge, which are common to all the arms of an army; and which 
ought to have been extended, and applied to artillery, fortification and 
topography The consequence has been, that the officers of infantry, 
artillery, engineers, and of the topographical corps, have had tbfe same 
degree and kind of instruction ; and the only real difference which exist- 
ed between them on leaving the school, consisted in the uniform of their 
respective corps or regiments. If any have been so fortunate as to ren- 
der themselves serviceable, either in the artillery or engineers, the cause 
must be sought for, in their own industry, and not in the education re- 
ceived by them at West Point, which was barely sufficient to excite a 
desire for military inquiries and of military pursuits. 

It remains to enumerate the branches of knowledge which are common 
to all the arms ; and those which are necessary, and appertain, more or 
less exclusively, to each or several of these arms. The subjoined table 
exhibits the two principal divisions of the instruction. The' first part 
includes the branches of knowledge that are necessary to all who are 
destined for any arm of the military establishment; either as officers in 
the exercise of their immediate professional duties, or as men of infor- 
mation, liable, in the course of their military career, to be intrusted with 
other interests. It is, therefore, that the mathematics for instance are ex- 
tended farther than is strictly necessary to the officer of infantry; 
that natural and experimental philosophy, and chemistry, are inserted 
under the elementary division, rather as forming part of a liberal educa- 
tion than of mere military utility ; and finally, the several kinds of draw- 
ings are only taught in the elementary division, as an advantageous in- 
troduction to the prompt acquisition and exercise of the art of topogra- 
phical delineations. This division or elementary part of the instruction! 
will require five professors, three teachers, and two instructors. The 
number of assistants, fcc. depend upon the number of individuals at a 
school. 

The same table presents the second part of the instruction, which 
is in addition to the first, and is necessary to those destined to the en- 
gineers, artillery, or topographical corps. Here the mathematics an* 
carried to a higher degree, which is rendered necessary by their ap- 
plication to machines, the theory of artillery, the construction of 
charts, fcc. Descriptive geometry is applied to machines and fortifica- 
tion. Fortification is taught to the extent which is exclusively necessa- 
ry to the officer of engineers ; and artillery to the extent that is only re- 
quired for the officers at that arm. Geometry and trigonometry receive 
their application to topographical operations, and spherical trigonometry 
and descriptive geometry, to the projection, &c. of charts. This part of 
the instruction will demand four professors. Because, either these two 
divisions of the instruction will be taught at one school, or two separate 



110 

schools, fn the first case, the professors of the elementary eourse will be 
insufficient, and cannot attend to a course of instruction thus extended: 
in the second case, the four professors before mentioned, become abso- 
lutely necessary. But whether the entire course (or both of these divi- 
sions of the instruction) shall be taught at the same, or at two separate 
schools, it will not be the less indispensable that a division of it, similar 
to that here, established, should exist in fact. The question is therefore 
reduced to this ; shall the elementary, or first part of the course of 
instruction, be taught at West Point, and the second part at a separate 
school, to be established elsewhere ? Or shall the second part constitute 
an additional class or classes, at the school of West Point, to consist of 
those cadets only who are destined for the engineers, artillery, and topo- 
graphical corps, and who shall have previously passed through the ele- 
mentary classes ? 

The second division of the course of instruction exhibited by the 
annexed table, and which must constitute, either a school, or classes 
of application, is practical as well as theoretical. The application of the 
elementary branches of instruction, and the branches of mathematics, to 
the theory of artillery, fortification, and topography, forms the theoretical 
or academic part of this division of the course of instruction, while the 
application of these theories to the circumstances of the ground, &c. 
requires, and must be taught to the students, by a course of actual experi- 
ments, and practical exemplifications in the field. It is necessary to make 
this remark, in order to a just appreciation of all the considerations which 
should influence in the decision of the present question. 

The advantages which may be derived from a union of the school of 
application, in the shape of additional classes, to that elementary school, 
are almost exclusively those of economy, and admit of being correctly 
ascertained ; they consist, 

1st. In having certain duties, that are common and necessary to both 
establishments, performed by the same individuals who are now employ- 
ed for those purposes at West Point. Such are the duties of the super- 
intendent, most of the officers of the military staff, and disbursing de- 
partment. 

2d. In the purchase of an additional site, which will be avoided. 

3d. In saving the additional expense of quarters, academical, and any 
other buildings, to the extent that they now exist at West Point, beyond 
the wants of that establishment. 

4th. In saving the expense of purchasing a library, instruments, fee- 
to the extent of those now on hand at West Point. 

5th. In saving the travelling and other expenses to which the graduates 
of the elementary school would be subjected, in order to join and com- 



Ill 

mence their course at the school of application, if these institutions were 
separate; and, 

6th. 1. 1 avoiding a loss of time on the part of the graduates, which 
would take (>lace on their transfer to the school of application in the 
case just supposed. 

The following are the considerations which oppose a union, and which 
consequently urge a separation of these two schools. 

1st. The classes of application will consist of those individuals destin- 
ed for the artillery, engineers, and topographical corps, who shall have 
graduated at the termination of the elementary course of instruction, and 
who will consequently be then promoted by brevet or otherwise, in the 
same manner as those destined for the infantry. There must probably 
be two classes of application, and the number of students of which they 
ought to consist, in order to supply the annual vacancies in their respec- 
tive arms, will not be less than seventy. The school will therefore be 
augmented by this amount, and will be composed of commissioned offi- 
cers and cadets, whose rights, interests and occupations will be more or 
less dissimilar; and who must consequently be governed by regulations, 
&c. essentially different, v* hich will at once destroy that unity of system, 
necessary to all military institutions. 

2d. The difference in point of rank, in the students of the elementary 
classes, and those composing the classes of application, will originate 
claims to precedence and superiority on the one part, and resistance to 
such pretensions on the other, which no regulations can restrain within 
proper limits. 

3d It will be necessary to have two sets of professions at the same school, 
and in several instances two professors of the same department of science, 
who will be independent of each other. Hence increased occasions of 
discord Individual interest and feelings must of necessity, and frequent- 
ly will be brought into collision; which experience has sufficiently proved, 
would lead, first to divisions among the academic staff, and finally, to the 
formation of parties among the officers and cadets, destructive of that 
harmony and order which should prevail, and are believed essential to 
the successful operations of the school. 

4th. The duties of the two sets of professors, the studies and occupa- 
tions of the officers and cadets, being different in their character, and re- 
quiring to be arranged differently, as to time and other circumstances, 
will render two distinct systems of organization and police indispensable, 
which frequently cannot be made to accord, without incurring some incon- 
venience or injury, or without the sacrifice of some advantage on the part 
•f one or the other division of the school, and perhaps of bofh. The su- 



perintendent will, in fact, have two schools to govern and conduct ; hi& 
time and attention will therefore be divided, alternately occupied with the 
peculiar concerns of each, and frequently employed in reconciling conflict- 
ing interests. The whole system of administration for the two schools, 
will be more or less controlled or influenced, by the inconvenient and un- 
necessary relations in which they are placed to each other. 

The advantages and disadvantages here enumerated, as attending the. 
union of the two divisions of the course of military instruction at the same 
school, are obviously too different in their kind to admit of being com- 
pared ; nor is it necessary that they should be. The expense attending 
the separate establishment of a school of application, might be offered as 
a reason for rejecting it altogether ; but by no means for uniting it to the 
elementary school, when the operations of both would be obstructed in 
consequence of so doing, and their ultimate success rendered more than 
doubtful. 

Among the advantages that will be derived from the establishment of a 
school of application, are the means it will afford of providing for other 
departments of national service, besides those which have been men- 
tioned ; and by locating it immediately under the eyes of the government, 
the measures necessary to enlarge, or to adapt it to the particular objects 
in view, will be more readily ascertained, and applied with greater cer- 
tainty of effect. The necessity of this institution will become urgent, in 
the event of one or more additional elementary schools being created. It 
will then be expedient, for those very reasons of economy which now form 
the only objections that can be opposed to it ; and it will be necessary, 
because it will enable the respective candidates for the engineer, artillery, 
and topographical corps, to be assembled at the same school, and to re- 
ceive in common their last degree of instruction ; and because, that, by no 
other means, can that uniformity in the instruction and duties of each of 
these arms be attained, which is essential to their perfection. 

We are, therefore, of opinion, that a school of application is decidedly 
necessary to the military service of the country ; that, to be rendered effi- 
cient, it ought to be separate from all immediate connexion with any other 
institution ; and that it should have a central location, and as little re- 
moved as possible from under the observation of government. 

Which is respectfully submitted to the honourable J. C. Calhoun, 
Secretary of War. 

(Signed) BERNARD, Brigadier General, 

WM. M'REE, Major of Engineers, 



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011 782 527 9 



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